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Abstract 
 
This research analyzes the problem of technology transition in the national air 
transportation system, focusing on the implementation of Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).  ADS-B  is  a  key  technology  in  the  Federal  
Aviation  Administration's plan to modernize the national civil air transportation  
surveillance system.  Data regarding airline perception of benefits, barriers, and 
knowledge of ADS-B is presented.  Market mechanisms that could potentially cause 
technology implementation failure are identified through game theoretic analysis of 
airline interview data.  Potential market failures identified include public goods 
failures, cost-benefit asymmetries, information asymmetries, and risk dominance.  
Potential institutional failures identified include organizational process failures and 
bureaucratic interests and politics.  Government action to correct market failures is 
explored.  Government mechanisms to correct market failures include technology 
value, support infrastructure development, positive incentives, putative measures, 
and mandates. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1    Objective 
 
 
This thesis examines the problem of technology adoption in air transportation, 
focusing on the case of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). The 
goal is to identify the market mechanisms that might impede technology 
implementation and to explore the potential role of government in correcting those 
problems.  This thesis also seeks to understand how stakeholders think about the 
costs and benefits of ADS-B. 
 
1.2    Motivation 
 
Air  traffic  demand  is  increasing,  but  capacity  is  constrained  by  an  antiquated  
air  traffic control (ATC) infrastructure.  The number of air traffic passengers in the 
U.S.  is  expected  to  grow  from  738  million  in  2005  to  1  billion  in  2015.   The 
number of commercial airline flights is expected to grow from 13 million in 2005 to 15 
million in 2015.  [22] Figure 1-1 shows the growth in air traffic demand in the United 
States in recent years. 
ADS-B, a satellite-based surveillance system, offers an opportunity to modernize 
the civil air traffic surveillance system.  It is a key enabling technology for the Federal 
Aviation Administration's (FAA) Next Generation Air Transportation System.
  18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1:  Traffic Increase in the NAS [22] 
 
(NextGen).  The current ATC system in the U.S. uses radar technology for 
surveillance. 
The FAA hopes that ADS-B will enable new applications and procedures that will 
provide benefits in three areas- safety, airspace capacity, and operational efficiency.  
Key benefits include: 
• Air-to-air surveillance capability.  
• Surveillance in remote or inhospitable areas that do not currently have 
coverage with radar.  
• Real-time traffic and aeronautical information in the cockpit.  
• Reduced separation and greater predictability in departure and arrival 
times.   
• Support of common separation standards, both horizontal and vertical, for 
all classes of airspace.  
• Improved ability of airlines to manage traffic and aircraft fleets.  
• Improved ability of air traffic controllers to plan arrivals and departures far in 
advance.  
• Reduced  cost  of  the  infrastructure  needed  to  operate  the  National  
Airspace  System.  
  19 
The  FAA's  Surveillance  and  Broadcast  System  (SBS)  program  office  has  
been  tasked with implementing ADS-B. [1] The SBS program is interested in 
encouraging voluntary early adoption of ADS-B by the airspace users.  The SBS 
program would also like to ensure successful completion of the program in the long 
run.  Early adoption is important because there is the perception of a pressing need 
for improvement in the current air transportation system.  The long term success of 
the program is important to delivering improvements to the national airspace and for 
reaping a return on investment. 
 
1.3    Background 
 
1.3.1    ADS-B 
 
ADS-B technology can be described by considering the components of its name.  
The system is automatic in that airplanes transmit data periodically, without 
interrogation. This is different from the radar system, which is based on 
interrogation-response.  The system is dependent in that it receives signals from 
similarly equipped ground stations and aircraft.  The surveillance portion of the 
system describes the intended use of the technology.  The broadcast component 
comes from the fact that an airplane's message is sent to all receivers in its vicinity, 
including ground stations and other equipped aircraft.  [1] Broadcast provides the 
potential for sending air to air signals, which can enable self-separation.  A picture of 
the ADS-B system is shown in Figure  1-2. 
There  are  two  types  of  ADS-B  functionality,  which  differ  in  required  
equipage  and capability:  ADS-B Out and ADS-B In.  ADS-B Out is an airplane's 
ability to broadcast messages. ADS-B In is the ability of an airplane to receive ADS-
B messages and display the information in the cockpit.   ADS-B Out enables 
applications that require an air to ground link.  ADS-B In enables air to air 
applications when used  in  conjunction  with  Cockpit  Display  of  Traffic  
Information  (CDTI),  a  method  of  displaying the messages received by the 
airplane in the airplane's cockpit.  [2] 
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Figure 1-2:  ADS-B System map [22] 
 
Hardware 
 
ADS-B hardware has both ground and aircraft components. On the airplane, a 
Mode-S Extended Squitter (ES) transponder, antenna, global positioning system 
(GPS), and a connection to the cockpit are required for ADS-B Out.  CDTI would 
also be needed to enable ADS-B In on the airplane.  The ground component of ADS-
B consists of  a  ground  station  for  receiving  and  processing  ADS-B  Out  
messages  from  aircraft.  Ground infrastructure also requires a link between the 
ground stations and the ATC automation interface.  [2] 
 
1.3.2    Proposed ADS-B Rule in the United States 
 
A notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for ADS-B was issued by the FAA in 
August 2007. The NPRM proposes to mandate airplane equipage with ADS-B Out 
by 2020.
  21 
Airplanes in the United States will need to equip to technical standards specified in 
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RCTA) document DO260A. According 
to the NPRM, ADS-B ground infrastructure replicating current radar surveillance 
coverage in the national air space (NAS) will be installed by 2014.  There is a seven 
year lag between completion of ground infrastructure deployment and mandated 
aircraft equipage to allow general aviation (GA) aircraft enough time to comply. 
The U.S. has adopted a dual link standard for ADS-B, meaning that it will use 
both 1090 ES and universal access transceiver (UAT) links.  1090ES broadcasts in 
the 1090MHz frequency and is intended for use by commercial aircraft.  UAT 
broadcasts on the 978 MHz frequency and is intended for use by GA aircraft.  The 
1090 link is the international standard for ADS-B. The FAA chose UAT in addition to 
1090 because it wanted to offer a cheaper avionics package for GA. Furthermore, 
the extra bandwidth afforded by UAT can be used to offer airspace information and 
weather services to GA.  The weather and information services come as part of a 
technology packaged called Flight Information Service-Broadcast (FIS-B). FIS-B will 
be deployed with ADS-B but is not an ADS-B technology.  FIS-B will not be offered 
on the 1090 link because airlines already use commercial weather products.  To 
bridge the 1090 and UAT link  frequencies, the FAA will deploy automatic dependent 
surveillance rebroadcast (ADS-  R), which will retransmit signals sent from one 
frequency via the second frequency.  Furthermore, during the technology transition 
to full ADS-B equipage, a technology called Traffic Information Surveillance-
Broadcast (TIS-B) will bridge the radar and ADS-B transmission frequencies.  [2] 
 
Rollout 
 
The four services deployed as part of the ADS-B program are divided into two 
packages.   The  first  package  is  for  ADS-B,  which  consists  of  ADS-B  and  
ADS-R.  The second package is for data link services, including TIS-B and FIS-B. 
The  SBS  program  is  also  funding  implementation  of  Airport  Surface  
Detection  Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) at major (OEP-35) airports. [25] ASDE-X is 
a ground surveillance program designed to improve visibility of airplanes on airport 
surfaces. 
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Although TIS-B, FIS-B, and ASDE-X are offered by the SBS program, they are not 
ADS-B functionalities. 
The SBS program is deploying ADS-B across the nation in two segments.  
Segment  1  is  a  trial  segment,  occurring  between  2009  and  2010.   In Segment 
1, TIS-B and FIS-B will be deployed throughout the NAS. In addition, ADS-B will be 
deployed at several trial sites, including Ft. Meyers, Philadelphia (PHL), Louisville 
(SDF), Gulf of Mexico (GoMex), and Ontario (ONT). [4] Ft.  Meyers, Florida will 
receive information services as part of segment 1.  This is part of a test program with 
Embrey Riddell's flight school to test these services for GA aircraft.  Areas receiving 
an ADS-B connection to ATC include Philadelphia and Louisville airports, as well as 
the Gulf of Mexico.  The Gulf of Mexico project is in collaboration with helicopter 
operators  in  the  region  and  is  intended  to  test  ADS-B  in  non-radar  areas.   
The  Louisville  site  was  selected  because  United  Parcel  Service  (UPS),  a  
cargo  airline,  is  an  early  adopter of ADS-B. It is intended as a demonstration of 
ADS-B in low traffic density environments.  The Louisville airspace is considered a 
low density traffic environment UPS is the dominant operator, with flights primarily at 
night.  Philadelphia will be used to test ADS-B in high density, or mixed equipage 
airspace.  There will also be an ADS-B ground station deployed at Ontario, 
California, another UPS hub.  However, there will not be a connection to ATC at 
Ontario. 
Segment 2 will deploy ADS-B ground stations across the nation.  Ground station  
deployment  will  occur  between  2010  to  2013,  progressing  from  the  East  to  
West  Coasts.  A contract for the segment 2 rollout was awarded to ITT in August of 
2007. 
 
Applications 
 
The SBS Concept of Operations (Conops) offers a set of applications for the initial 
round of applications.  [3] 
• ATC Surveillance  
• Airport Surface Situational Awareness  
• Final Approach Runway Occupancy Awareness 
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• Enhanced Visual Acquisition   
• Enhanced Visual Approach  
• Cockpit Display of Traffic Information/ Multifunction Display Assisted Visual  
Separation  
• Merging and Spacing  
• In-Trail Procedures and Application in Oceanic Airspace Conflict Detection  
• Weather and NAS Situational Awareness  
 
Conflict detection and Weather and NAS Situational Awareness benefit GA only.  
The  Conops  notes  that  conflict  detection  is  not  intended  to  be  a  traffic  
collision  avoidance system(TCAS) replacement.  Weather and NAS Situational 
Awareness are enabled through FIS-B, which is only available on the UAT link. 
The ATC surveillance application aspects air traffic control applications.  Airport  
surface situational awareness, final approach runway occupancy awareness, 
enhanced  visual  acquisition,  cockpit  display  of  traffic  information/  multifunction  
display  assisted  visual  separation,  and  enhanced  visual  approach  rely  on  
ADS-B  In  because  the applications utilize CDTI. Airport surface situational 
awareness, final approach runway occupancy awareness, and enhanced visual 
acquisition uses a cockpit display to provide situational awareness on the surface, 
on approach, and in airport airspaces respectively.  Enhanced visual approach uses 
a cockpit display to continue the use of visual procedures in marginal conditions, 
such as haze, fog, ect.  [3] 
 
1.3.3    Airplane Equipage in the United States 
 
Current airline equipage in the U.S. can be divided into four categories: not 
equipped, latent, latent for ADS-B Out, and latent for CDTI. 
Not equipped aircraft lack upgradeable links, Multifunction Displays (MFDs) 
capable of ADS-B, and an acceptable GPS.  These airplanes are likely to be analog 
airplanes.  Also in this category are early ARINC 429 data bus airplanes, the first 
generation of digital bus airplanes, which might have a flight management system 
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(FMS) not capable of supporting ADS-B. These aircraft would need new displays 
and processors and a link to the FMS. 
Latent aircraft have a GPS interface and display, but need a special type 
certificate (STC) for an ADS-B link. Generally, needing an STC indicates some level 
of hardware modification. 
Latent for ADS-B Out aircraft have Mode-S transponders that can be upgraded to 
ES and can interface with the existing GPS receiver.  Latent aircraft have integrated  
avionics,  and  a  modern  FMS  with  integrated  functions  that  interface  to  
electronic  cockpit  displays.   Upgrading  these  aircraft  for  ADS-B  Out  would  
require  software  upgrades  for  the  central  processor  and  upgrades  to  certain  
line  replaceable  units  (LRUs).  For ADS-B In, these aircraft would need 
recertification of the software with CDTI. 
Latent for CDTI airplanes have a transponder that can be upgraded for ADS-B, a 
MFD, and an interface to GPS. To upgrade to ADS-B In, these aircraft would need 
recertification of the software for CDTI. 
About 5000 aircraft in the United States are equipped with the DO-260fiversion of 
ADS-B. However, some of these aircraft have an unacceptable horizontal protection  
limit  (HPL)  because  some  avionics  manufacturers  misinterpreted  the  DO-260  
requirements. 
The equipage and latency status of the airplanes do not necessarily correlate 
with the cost of equipage.  Older airplanes might be easier to equip than newer 
airplanes. The integrated electronics of new planes might require recertification of 
software and may not be entirely compatible with ADS-B. Both these problems could 
add to the time and cost of the upgrade.  By comparison, replacing the entire system 
of an older airplane may be easier than upgrading a newer plane.  [17] 
 
1.3.4    ADS-B Infrastructure in the United States 
 
A legacy infrastructure of data link services (TIS-B and FIS-B) exists on the coasts of 
the United States, shown in Figure 1-3.  [4] There have also been tests of ADS-B in 
Alaska and the Ohio Valley through the Capstone and Safe Flight 21 initiatives, 
respectively.
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Figure 1-3:  TIS-B and FIS-B Infrastructure[4] 
 
The Capstone program in Alaska was used to test and certify ADS-B in non-radar 
environments (ADS-B NRA). The Capstone trials showed ADS-B can offer capacity, 
efficiency, and safety benefits.  [25] 
 
1.4    ADS-B In a Global Context 
 
ADS-B is gaining international momentum.  Australia, Europe, Canada, Indonesia, 
and China have all begun ADS-B initiatives.  Australia has implemented ADS-B in 
the Outback.  Europe has begun ADS-B trials in several locations through its 
CASCADE program.  The ADS-B initiative with the greatest influence on U.S. 
domestic operations is Canada.  In particular, NavCanada has mandated ADS-B for 
operations over the Hudson Bay, an airspace traversed by many U.S. carriers on 
trans-continental routes.  [15, 11] 
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Link Differences 
 
The instantiations of ADS-B in each country differ based upon the structure of the 
country's ATC system.  Key differences between international and U.S. ADS-B 
implementations are in the link offered, the ADS-B standard required, and the vision 
for a future control paradigm. 
Europe, Canada and Australia offer a single 1090 MHz link.  Australia's analysis 
of costs showed that the 1090 MHz link would not be significantly more costly than 
UAT for GA. Furthermore, Airservices Australia does not offer weather services to 
GA because of the availability of third party resources, such as XM weather.  [7] 
In addition, Europe, Canada, and Australia have adopted a DO260 standard for 
ADS-B, whereas the U.S.  NPRM requires the DO260A standard.   The difference 
between the DO260 and 260A links is explained in the following section. 
A final difference between ADS-B programs in Europe and the United States lies 
in the control paradigm vision.  While the United States envisions self-separation of 
air traffic, Europe sees control of air traffic remaining with ground controllers.  It has 
been argued that this difference is minor because it pertains to applications at least 
twenty years in the future.  It is assumed that there will be international collaboration 
on ADS-B development to ensure consistency in the global airspace. 
 
DO260 v.  DO260A 
 
DO-260 differs from DO-260A in the type of quality message sent. 
DO-260 requires quality information to be sent through the Navigational 
Uncertainty Category (NUC).  DO-260A separates the quality information into 
integrity and accuracy.  Integrity information is sent through the Navigational Integrity 
Containment (NIC) and Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL). Accuracy information is 
sent through the Navigation Accuracy Category (NAC). Accuracy information is not 
required for ADS-B Out if integrity information is known.   However, for air-to-air 
applications, accuracy information might be necessary.  Therefore, DO-260 
compliant aircraft are ADS-B Out capable, but may not be ADS-B In capable.
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There has been some controversy about weather DO-260 data is good enough to 
use for ADS-B Out.  The issue lies in the source of integrity information for the GPS 
receiver.  GPS receivers output HPL and Horizontal Figure of Merit (HFOM). The  
HPL  is  based  on  the  GPS  receiver's  ability  to  detect  a  bad  ranging  signal  
from  a  faulty GPS satellite.  The HFOM is based on the expected accuracy of the 
position data, assuming all satellites are working correctly.   DO-260 allows the NUC 
to be based upon HPL, or HFOM if HPL is unavailable.  However, because HFOM is 
based upon the assumption that satellite is working correctly, the user is not 
protected from satellite ranging errors.  DO-260A requires that the NIC value be 
based upon HPL.  If  the  NUC  generated  by  DO-260  is  based  upon  HPL,  then  
it  is  the  same  as  the  data generated by the NIC in DO-260A. Since DO-260 
change 1 requires the NUC  to  be  based  upon  HPL,  any  avionics  that  comply  
with  DO-260  would  be  ADS-B  Out compliant.  Air Services Australia has worked 
around the integrity problem by certifying each airframe for ADS-B operation.  [8] 
 
1.5    Stakeholders 
 
There are several major stakeholders for ADS-B in the United States. One 
stakeholder group is the airspace users, which include GA, air cargo airlines, 
regional airlines, and major domestic carriers.  GA encompasses a wide variety of 
airspace users, ranging from recreational airplanes to business jets. Air cargo 
airlines do not carry passengers.  Regionals are airlines that contract flights for the 
major carriers.  Passengers are generally unfamiliar with the names of the regional 
airlines.  Examples include American Eagle and Comair.  Major domestic carriers 
are the major passenger airlines that are fly domestic U.S. routes.  Examples would 
include United and American. 
Manufacturers are another stakeholder group.  They include airplane 
manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus.  For the purposes of this thesis, avionics 
suppliers, such as Rockwell Collins or Honeywell, will also be classified as 
manufacturers. 
The FAA is also a stakeholder in ADS-B. The FAA plays a unique role in ADS-B 
because it functions as both a regulatory body and as a market agent.  The FAA  
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regulatory role is accountable to the public for ensuring the safety of air 
transportation.  The FAA fulfills its regulatory duties by controlling certification, 
making rules, and setting standards.  The FAA market agent role comes from it 
function in ATC. By providing ATC, the FAA sells benefits and services to the 
airlines.  Furthermore, the FAA purchases ground equipment from the manufacturers 
(ITT) in order to operate ATC. 
 
1.6    Thesis Outline 
 
This  thesis  will  provide  an  examination  of  technology  adoption  problems  
specific  to  ADS-B  using  a  market  failure  framework.   Game  theory  is  used  to  
show  where  market failures are likely to occur in airspace user voluntary early 
equipage of ADS-  B. Focused interviews with airlines provide the data for the game 
theoretic analysis.  The thesis will also discuss and evaluate potential government 
actions for correcting these market failures.  Figure   1-4 shows a map of inputs and 
outputs through the flow of the thesis.  In the thesis map, the dashed lines represent 
the flow of data while the solid lines represent process and thought flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-4:  Thesis Map 
Chapter one motivates the research.  It provides background on ADS-B, 
introducing the technology and current regulations associated with the technology.  
There is also a discussion of international ADS-B efforts. 
Chapter two reviews the literature pertaining to the analysis conducted in this 
thesis.  It reviews work in economics and game theory regarding technology 
adoption.
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It  also  reviews  the  applications  of  theory  to  problems  with  characteristics  
similar  to  ADS-B,  such  as  transportation  infrastructure  problems.   The chapter 
concludes with an overview of literature regarding government policy from the fields 
of political science, economics, and air transportation. 
Chapter  three  lays  out  the  framework  for  analysis  used  in  this  thesis.   
Market failure and game theory concepts are introduced.  A definition and 
characterization of ADS-B used in the analysis is provided.  Several games used in 
later analyses are set up. 
Chapter four introduces the methodology for data collection through focused 
interviews with airlines. Information regarding the number and types of airlines and 
airline personnel interviewed is presented.  Interview protocol is reviewed.  An 
overview of the motivation and objective of each portion of the interview is provided.  
Methods for distilling the data are discussed. 
Chapter five presents the results of the airline interviews.  Data from each section 
of the interview is presented. Discussion of the results that address specific points 
made by individual airlines. 
Chapter six analyzes the data presented in chapter five using game theory.  Free 
market conditions are assumed for all games.   Several forms of potential market 
failure in the implementation of ADS-B are identified.  Sources of market failure are 
discussed. 
Chapter  seven  examines  the  role  of  government  in  correcting  market  
failures.  Mechanisms through which government can act are presented.  
Implementation difficulties are discussed. 
Chapter eight provides a summary of the findings and conclusions, contributions 
of the thesis, and future work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
The problem of technology adoption has not been extensively studied in air 
transportation.  Previous technology initiatives have either been mandated by the 
government or entirely market-driven.   However,  other  fields  have  studied  
problems  with  characteristics  that  pertain  to  the  ADS-B  technology  adoption  
problem.   There is a substantial amount of economics literature on the theory of 
technology adoption.  This literature presents general theories that can be adapted 
to a variety of problems.  Particularly relevant to ADS-B is the study of technology 
adoption with externalities.  More specifically, some economists have studied the 
effect of uncertainty on technology adoption.  The economic theory has been 
applied to multinational transportation project and risk and security problems. 
 
The role of government in technology adoption has been studied by both 
economists and political scientists.  There is also literature on the role of government 
specifically in air transportation. 
 
Finally, in air transportation, there have been studies of stakeholder views 
regarding ADS-B. These stakeholder studies have also explored incentivization 
policies for technology adoption. 
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2.1    Technology Adoption and Externalities 
 
Technology adoption behavior has been studied by many economists, particularly in 
the context of innovation systems.  Of particular relevance to ADS-B is the literature 
pertaining to technology adoption with externalities.  Reinganum (1981) published a 
series of articles using game theory to analyze technology diffusion.  In the first 
article, technology diffusion is modeled as a two-person non-zero-sum game.  She 
assumes the firms are in direct competition and that one firm will gain at the expense 
of the other if they adopt earlier.  Consequently, the analysis found that for identical 
firms, there will be a “diffusion" in technology adoption times, with one firm adopting 
relatively early and the other adopting relatively late.  For non-identical firms, she 
found that an asymmetric Nash equilibrium will exist.  [29] The diffusion model was 
extended to multiple firm markets in a second paper.  [30] These assumptions do not 
quite fit the problem of ADS-B, because the technology is dependent in nature. 
Fudenburg and Tirole (1983) also pursued a game theoretic approach to 
technology adoption, analyzing the temporal aspect of adoption for multiple player 
games.  They  also  assume  that  the  first  mover  has  a  competitive  advantage  
over  later  adopters.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  diffusion  model,  they  found  
that  when  the  gain  from  preemption is low, firms are likely to adopt later.  
Furthermore, Fudenburg and Tirole found that in games with more than two players, 
the gain from adoption is unlikely to be symmetric, even for identical players.  [13] 
An adoption model that matches well with ADS-B is the idea of technology 
adoption in network industries.  Shy (2001) introduces the idea of market failures in 
network industries, and proposes using game theory to study these failures.  
Although Shy presents technology adoption in a network theory framework, his 
specific analysis is limited to technology replacement in time.  [33] 
Reignanum,  Fundenburg and Tirole,  and Shy all assume perfect information in  
their systems, a condition that does not apply for ADS-B. This means that firms 
understand the costs and benefits of adoption and all agents have the same 
information.  As will be shown in the airline surveys, there is a tremendous amount of 
uncertainty regarding ADS-B benefits, which is a key factor in the airline's technology 
adoption  decisions. 
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2.2    Technology Adoption and Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty has been factored into technology adoption with externalities models.  
Farrell and Saloner (1985) studied how standardization in industry can trap the 
industry in an inferior technology under incomplete information.  [12] This is 
particularly relevant to ADS-B, since surveillance technology is necessarily 
standardized.  Furthermore, there is incomplete information regarding ADS-B 
technologies. 
The ideas of Farrell and Saloner are refined and formalized for general cases in 
the idea of risk dominance, introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).  Harsanyi and 
Selten show that strategic uncertainty in games with multiple equilibria can lead to 
the selection of Pareto inferior solutions.  [16] Risk dominance plays an important 
role when considering the likely actions of stakeholders in ADS-B. Risk dominance 
was shown to be a factor in coordination failures by Straub (1995).  [34] 
 
2.3    Applications of Theory 
 
The economic theory of technology adoption has been used to study multinational 
transportation projects and a class of problems called interdependent security 
problems (IDS). 
Multinational transportation projects have many characteristics that parallel the 
ADS-B project.  Both projects require heavy up-front investment and coordination of 
stakeholders with information and cost benefit asymmetries, have government as  a 
stakeholder, and exhibit network externalities. 
The network characteristics of transportation systems were characterized by 
Laird, Nellthrop, and Mackie (2005).  [19] An analysis of multinational transport 
projects in Latin America was conducted by Caracamo-Diaz and Goddard (2007).  
They conduct  a  game  theoretic  analysis  of  market  failures  under  different  
information  and  cost- 
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benefit asymmetry  conditions.   They also investigated the role of government and 
the impact of government on system risk and benefit.  [6] Fujimura (2004) conducted 
case studies of multinational infrastructure projects in Asia, showing the risks and 
coordination difficulties involved in these projects.  [14] 
Kunreuther and Heal (2003) used game theoretic techniques to examine how 
companies invest in protection from risk in a system with network dependencies.  
They incorporated probabilistic models of risk into the games, creating a method for 
analyzing IDS problems.  This model contrasts with work done in transportation, 
which separates market effects from system risk.   Kunreuther and Heal also 
investigated potential government policies by examining mechanisms through which 
governments can correct identified failures.  [18] 
 
2.4    Government Policies 
 
Government policies have been studied in a number of disciplines.  The field of 
welfare economics has studied stakeholder incentivization extensively.  In welfare 
economics, the role of government is to correct market inefficiencies.   However, the 
theory of welfare economics has somewhat limited application to ADS-B because it 
assumes a perfectly competitive market. 
Government policies for technology adoption with network effects and public 
goods characteristics were studied by Dybvig and Spatt (1983).  They described two 
types of public goods problems- early adopters and late adopters.  Furthermore, they 
investigated the ability of government mandates and anonymous subsidies to push 
markets to Pareto-optimal equilibria.  They found that mandates can be effective 
because they offer insurance to early adopters.  Furthermore, they found that 
anonymous subsidies can be effective in encouraging technology adoption, but it 
may incentivize the wrong players to adopt.   [9]  The  proof  offered  by  Dybvig  and  
Spatt  is  valuable  because  it offers insight into a counterintuitive phenomenon 
observed in practice.  However, the analysis of government actions does not 
encompass all possible scenarios for air transportation technology adoption. 
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From a policy perspective, Sandler (2001) investigates the role of international 
organizations in encouraging adoption of international public goods.  Sandler 
provides a taxonomy of types of public goods, noting that all goods have different 
amounts of public and private good characteristics.  Government actions are 
proposed in accordance with taxonomic classification of the good.  In particular, 
Sandler notes that for governments to achieve desired public goods benefits, the 
private goods characteristics of the good can be leveraged to induce stakeholders to 
adopt.  [32] This idea is particularly interesting and applicable to ADS-B, which is a 
good with both private and public goods characteristics. 
In the field of air transportation, Marais and Weigel (2006) have studied the role 
of government in air transportation infrastructure projects.   They propose 
characterizing projects by stakeholder costs and benefits and deploying government 
action accordingly.  They also provide a framework within which to study potential 
government actions for air transportation projects.   [21]  This  thesis  uses  the  
government  action  framework  of  Marais  and  Weigel  to  study  potential  
government  policies  for  ADS-B. 
 
2.5 ADS-B Stakeholder Studies for the Domestic U.S.  
 
For ADS-B in the domestic United States, stakeholder views have been expressed 
by industry bodies representing airspace user groups.  For example, the Air 
Transport Association (ATA), which represents the major domestic airlines, has 
published several opinion pieces that speak for the airline perspective on ADS-B. A 
key piece of literature is the ATA response to the NPRM for ADS-B Out, which 
summarizes the airline industry position regarding ADS-B. [5] The Aircraft Owner 
and Pilots Association (AOPA) has also written opinion pieces regarding the GA 
view of ADS-B costs and benefits.  [27] In addition, it is likely that AOPA has 
submitted to a response to the NPRM for ADS-B Out, but it has not been published.   
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Because both the ATA and AOPA represent industry groups, neutral party studies 
would be valuable in validating their conclusions and in helping frame their positions 
within a system-level view. 
Lester (2007) has studied stakeholder opinions as a neutral observer.  He 
examined stakeholder views ADS-B from an individual pilot perspective, with an 
emphasis on general aviation issues.  Lester has also explored potential government 
policies based upon the results of the study.  [20] However, because individual pilots 
do not represent the views of an airline, it is necessary to conduct a study of airline 
views of ADS-B. 
 
2.6    Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a review of key literature pertaining to technology adoption 
and stakeholder views of ADS-B.  The ideas presented can be applied to air 
transportation, studying problems of technology adoption, such as ADS-B. This 
thesis will use the market failure framework and game theoretic analysis technique 
introduced by Shy.  Other works introduced in this chapter will inform the analysis of 
the games and help in interpreting the results.  For policy analysis, the thesis will use 
the framework established by Marais and Weigel.  The data presented in this thesis 
will offer a neutral observer reporting of airline views regarding technology adoption, 
with particular emphasis on ADS-B. The analysis presented in this thesis will serve 
to bridge the theory of technology adoption with the practice of air transportation 
technology implementation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Market Failures Framework 
 
A market failure framework is used to study potential problems in adoption of ADS- B 
under free market conditions.  The free market conditions represent the dynamics of 
ADS-B equipage without government intervention.   This would be the case of 
voluntary early equipage by the airlines.  The proposed mandate and other potential  
government  actions  will  be  evaluated  in  Chapter  seven  (Policies)  of  this  thesis  
for  their ability to correct problems identified by the market failure analysis. 
ADS-B  is  a  special  type  of  market  known  as  a  network  market.   The 
network characteristics of ADS-B make it prone to market failure. Game theory can 
be used to illustrate market failures.  Data for the game theory analyses were 
collected through  stakeholder  interviews,  which  are  detailed  in  Chapters  four  
and  five  of  this  thesis.  Data from general aviation users was collected in a 
previous thesis by Lester.  [20] 
Government intervention may be effective in correcting market failures.   Policy 
actions are suggested using a framework outlined by Marais and Weigel.  [21] 
 
3.1    Market Characterization of ADS-B 
 
An economic market is defined as a social structure that facilitates the exchange of 
goods.  The air transportation system has many markets.  The characteristics of the 
markets vary with the nature of the technology and stakeholder interactions.  ADS-B 
comprises a unique market within the air transportation system.
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The ADS-B market good is the engineering system.  It includes the ADS-B 
technology, as well as the services and benefits derived from the technology.  
Stakeholders  in  the  ADS-B  system  include  airspace  users,  the  FAA/ATC,  and  
the  manufacturers/service providers.  Airspace users include major airlines, 
regionals airlines, cargo, business jets, GA, ect.  In the market, the role of the 
FAA/ATC is distinct from its role as a regulatory body.  In essence, the FAA should 
be considered as two separate entities- a regulatory entity and a market agent.  
Figure 3-1 shows a schematic of the ADS-B market system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1:  ADS-B Economic System 
 
Airspace users are buyers in the market; manufacturers are sellers.   The FAA 
functions as both a seller and a buyer.  Airspace users buy avionics (airplanes) from 
manufacturers and services and benefits from the FAA. The FAA buys technology 
capability from the manufacturers so that they may sell the services to the airlines. 
 
Network Market Traits 
 
The  main  attributes  of  a  network  market  are:   1)  complementarity,  
compatibility,  and standards; 2) consumption externalities; 3) switching costs and 
lock-in; and 4)  significant  economics  of  scale  in  production.   [33] ADS-B exhibits 
all four of these characteristics. 
Complementarity, compatibility, and standards mean that goods come as a 
system rather than as individual components.   A classic example is the CD player, 
which would be useless to consumers without CDs.  Likewise, ADS-B is a system 
product.
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The avionics, ground stations, and ATC displays must all be coordinated. In addition, 
ADS-B needs procedures and applications to deliver benefits. 
Consumption externalities refer to the phenomenon where the utility derived from  
a  good  is  affected  by  the  number  of  others  using  similar  or  compatible  
products.  A commonly cited example is the telephone.   A telephone's value to an 
individual increases as the network of users with compatible technologies increases.  
Likewise, due to the dependent nature of the technology, the value of ADS-B 
increases as more people equip. For example, having more airplanes equipped with 
ADS-B would enable procedures that allow for closer separation, thereby increasing 
airspace capacity or reducing delays.  This would benefit both airspace users and 
the FAA. Furthermore, having more airplanes equipped would benefit airplane 
manufacturers because they would be able to manufacture more units, thereby 
employing economies of scale in production. 
Lock-in  occurs  when  the  cost  of  switching  to  a  new  technology  is  high.   
There  can  be  many  types  of  switching  costs,  including  training  and  learning  
time,  data  conversion, search cost, loyalty cost, and contracts.  [33] For ADS-B, 
aircraft equipage is likely to impose a large switching cost on the airspace users.  
Aircraft owners must pay for avionics, which can be expensive.  In addition, 
commercial carriers face added costs from lost revenue due out of service time and 
pilot retraining.  The FAA must invest money in ground stations, applications 
development, and retraining air traffic controllers.  Airplane manufacturers also incur 
switching costs by having to modify avionics production. 
Economics of scale in production occur when the cost of manufacturing a product 
decreases as the number of units produced increases.  Presumably, as more aircraft 
equip with ADS-B, the cost of the avionics will decrease.  This can be attributed to 
the fact that manufacturers will be able to distribute their technology development 
and certification costs over a larger number of users.  Also, presumably, the cost of  
ATC  services  might  decrease  as  more  users  equip  and  controllers  reap  
operational  efficiency and situational awareness benefits. 
 
 
  40 
3.1.1    Nature of ADS-B goods 
 
The ADS-B engineering system has both public and private good characteristics.  A 
public good is defined as being non-rival and non-exclusive.   [32] This means that if 
one person purchases a good, the good will be available to all other users in the 
system as well. 
Some benefits that come from ADS-B are private in nature.   Examples  would  
include  potential  fuel,  efficiency,  and  cost  savings  for  the  airlines.   For ATC, 
the private benefit would be a reduction in operating costs, since ADS-B is cheaper 
than radar. 
ADS-B benefits also have public good characteristics, which arise from the 
network structure of the market. The externalities created by ADS-B equipage are 
examples of public goods.  Increased safety and improved situational awareness 
can be considered public benefits because if only one user equips, all other users 
will also reap benefits.  Furthermore, safety benefits are difficult to quantify and often 
do not factor into a company's business case.  Some efficiency improvements are 
also public benefits.  If one airline equips, non-equipped aircraft using sharing an 
operating environment (e.g. airports or airspace) will also reap efficiency benefit. 
 
3.2    Market Failures Overview 
 
Market failures are likely to arise in network markets with products with public good 
characteristics.  By definition, a market failure is an inefficient allocation of 
resources.  For ADS-B, a market failure can be defined as a case where users 
choose not to equip. 
There are several sources of market failure.  These include abuse of market 
power, externalities, public goods, and asymmetric information or uncertainty.   
Abuse of market power encompasses imperfect competition scenarios, such as 
monopolies and oligopolies.   In  situations  where  a  firm  dominates  the  market,  
they  may  use  their  power to achieve certain market situations that are not optimal.  
Externalities refer to benefits produced by one market agent that may benefit other 
market agents.  A public goods market failure occurs when system-wide benefits 
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justify purchase of the good, but individual benefits are too diffuse for any one agent 
in the market to justify purchase of the good.  Asymmetric information occurs when 
some information regarding the market is available to certain users but not to others.  
Having asymmetric information means that different users will not always act in 
accordance with rational choice theory.   Uncertainty  is  when  risk  is  added  to  the  
market  and  users  have a probability distribution associated with their actions as 
opposed to a one or  zero probability of making a particular choice.  [10] 
 
3.3    Institutional Failures Overview 
 
Institutional failures are analogous to market failures.   Institutional failures occur 
when government intervention in a market leads to inefficient allocation of resources.  
An example would be when the government regulates a less efficient technology 
standard. 
Examples of institutional failures include bureaucratic interests and politics and 
organizational process failures. Bureaucratic interests and politics is an 
organizational interest in wealth and power.   It  can  potentially  lead  to  a  lock-in  
to  the  existing  distribution of rewards.  Organizational process failures occur when 
the government's standard operating procedures do not fit into nonstandard or 
evolving situations.  The government may fail to change their standard operating 
procedures to accommodate new situations.  [28] 
 
3.4    Game Theoretic Analysis Overview 
 
Game theory is used to evaluate the existence of market and institutional failures in 
ADS-B. 
Although there is an NPRM for ADS-B, free market conditions are assumed in 
the game theoretic analysis.  Free market conditions model a situation where 
airspace users voluntarily equip.  This assumption will allow for an objective 
assessment of all possible government intervention actions. 
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Under the free market assumption, several games can be played.  Game 
situations arise at stakeholder coordination points. Therefore, there are games 
between 1) major domestic carriers; 2) major domestic carriers and other airspace 
users; 3) the FAA and airlines; and 4) airlines and the manufacturers.  This thesis 
will analyze the first three interactions listed because the data collected pertains 
most to those games.  In addition, game four is similar to game two. 
The first game, between major domestic carriers, is an n-player game.  A unique 
trait of n-player games is the ability to form coalitions through side payments, 
communication, and bargaining.  Assume airlines are not allowed to form coalitions 
or collude because this would violate anti-trust laws.  Furthermore, assume airlines 
make equipage decisions independently.  The assumptions simplify the n-player 
game such that it can be represented as a 2x2 game.  [26] 
The game between major domestic carriers and other airspace users assumes 
that each airspace user group acts as a coalition.   The `other airspace users' 
coalition includes GA, regionals, and other smaller air carriers. Although the users in 
the `other  airspace  users'  coalition  are  quite  diverse,  they  have  similarities  in  
their  structure  that make them a cohesive coalition for game theoretic analysis.  In 
particular, other  airspace users often do not have the resources to invest in new 
technologies proposed  by  the  FAA,  making  them  a  group  of  relatively  late  
adopters.   Furthermore,  the  other  airspace  user  group  has  a  different  set  of  
benefits  objectives  than  the  major  carriers.  For this game, asymmetry of costs 
and benefits and asymmetric information are modeled. 
The majors to FAA game is also asymmetric in costs and benefits.  Furthermore, 
a dynamic game will be played between the majors and the FAA, simulating possible 
multiple steps to ADS-B equipage. 
 
3.4.1    Static Games 
 
All of the static games analyzed are 2x2 games that can be expressed as a normal 
form game.  Figure 3-2 shows the 2x2 game setup. 
Each  user  has  two  decisions,  equip  or  don't  equip  (invest  or  don't  invest).    
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Figure 3-2:  2x2 Normal Form Game 
 
One player's decisions are shown across the top and the other player's decisions are 
shown along the side.  Player payoffs are shown inside the squares.  For purposes 
of clarity, payoffs for the side player (rows) will be shown in the top left hand corner 
of each square.  Payoffs for the top player (columns) will be shown in the bottom 
right hand corner of each square. 
 
3.4.2    Extensive Form Games 
 
Extensive form games are used to analyze multiple-step decision making.  Figure  3-
3  shows an extensive form game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3:  Extensive Form Game Structure 
 
The game is formulated in a tree structure, with each node representing a
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decision point for the players.  The branches of the tree represent the decisions 
available to the players.  At each node, one player makes a decision.  For the game 
in Figure 3-3, Player A makes the first decision and Player B makes the second 
decision.  Payoffs are shown at the terminus of the tree.  The branches of the tree 
may have associated  probabilities  to  model  the  likelihood  that  a  player  will  
choose  a  particular  action.  The tree will have branches with probabilities when 
players make decisions based on factors other than simple payoffs.  An example of 
another factor is risk. 
 
3.4.3    Equilibrium Concepts 
 
For every game, there can be a set of feasible steady-state solutions, or equilibria.  
The three equilibrium ideas used in this thesis are Nash equilibrium, Pareto 
optimality, and risk dominance. 
A solution is a Nash equilibrium if no player can benefit by unilaterally changing 
their strategy while the other player keeps their strategy the same.  Nash equilibria 
suggest that there exist solutions that will tend to attract players. 
In  games  with  multiple  Nash  equilibria,  the  equilibria  can  be  Pareto  
ranked.  Pareto optimality is the situation where no agent's position can be improved 
without making another agent worse off.  [10] By definition, a Pareto optimal solution 
is also a Nash equilibria, although the converse is not true.  For the case of ADS-B, 
the Pareto optimal Nash equilibria can be defined as (equip, equip). 
Risk dominance models player behavior under uncertainty.  The risk associated 
with choosing a particular strategy is the cost to one player if they unilaterally deviate 
from that strategy.  [16] If an equilibrium is Pareto optimal but risk dominant, players 
are not likely to select it.  Intuitively,  the strategy for which a player seeks to lose  
more  in  the  face  of  payoff  uncertainty  is  considered  risk  dominant.   Therefore,  
the  probability of a player choosing a particular strategy is not only influenced by 
pure  payoff,  but  also  by  the  amount  of  strategic  uncertainty  in  the  system.   
For  a  2x2  game,  the  risk  of  a  solution  is  its  Nash  product.   The equilibrium 
with the higher Nash product dominates.  [34] 
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3.4.4    Equilibrium Concept Example 
 
To illustrate these equilibrium concepts, consider the game in Figure   3-2.  Assume 
a12 = a21 and b12 = b21.  Assume a coordination game, so the following conditions 
hold: 
     a11 > a12     (3.1) 
     a11 > a22     (3.2) 
Analogous conditions hold for Player B. 
Then, the game has two Nash equilibria:  (a11; b11) and (a22; b22), the solution in 
the upper left and bottom right corners.  Because of the condition in equation (3.2), 
(a11; b11) is the Pareto dominant solution. 
The Nash product of the (a11; b11) solution is:  (a11     a21)   (b11     b12)  
The Nash product of the (a22; b22) solution is:  (a22     a12)   (b22     b21) 
The Pareto inferior solution, (a22; b22), would risk dominate if it had a higher Nash 
product.  So, if (a22     a12)   (b22     b21) > (a11     a21)   (b11     b12), the Pareto 
inferior solution risk dominates. 
 
3.5    Conclusion 
 
The ADS-B technology adoption problem is formulated as a network market system.  
The stakeholders in the ADS-B market are defined to be airspace users, 
manufacturers, and the FAA. The good in the market is defined to be the ADS-B 
engineering system. 
The network characteristics of ADS-B make it prone to market failures.  Several 
types of market and institutional failures are described.  Game theory is introduced 
as a tool for examining market failures.  Two types of games are presented- a static 
game in normal form and a dynamic game in extensive form. In addition, the game 
theoretic equilibrium concepts of Nash Equilibria, Pareto Optimality, and Risk 
Dominance are introduced.  The situation where all airspace users equip with ADS-B 
is defined as the market efficient, or Pareto optimal solution.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Airline Interview Methodology 
 
Airlines were interviewed to collect data for the game theoretic analysis of market 
failures.  Airline interviews provide insight into how one stakeholder group thinks 
about ADS-B. This chapter outlines the method used for conducting airline 
interviews and analyzing the data. 
 
4.1    Interview Participants 
 
Airlines surveyed included domestic national carriers, regional airlines, cargo 
airlines, and business jet share programs.   A total of fourteen airlines were 
interviewed.   A distribution of interview participants by airline type is shown below in 
Figure   4-1.  Airline type was determined by self-reported affiliation.  In general, 
domestic national  carriers  are  those  that  belong  to  the  Air  Transport  
Association,  regional  carriers  belong to the Regional Airline Association, and 
general aviation are represented by  the Aircraft owners and Pilots Association. 
Airlines asked to participate are those with the largest number of daily operations 
according to ETMS data from 2003.   Additionally, airlines that have significantly 
expanded their operations since 2003 were interviewed. 
Of the ten domestic national airlines asked to participate in the interview, eight 
responded, one chose to use the official Air Transport Association (ATA) response to 
the NPRM as a proxy for their views, and one chose to speak off the record.  The
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data for the off the record interview is not presented, although the contextual 
information  they  provided  did  inform  thinking  in  the  analysis  of  results.   Of  the  
nine  regional  airlines  invited  to  participate  in  the  interview,  three  responded.   
All of the cargo carriers invited to participate in the interview responded.  There was 
some difficulty finding contacts at the business jet programs, but one of the four 
major business jet share programs was interviewed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1:  Airlines Interviewed 
 
The  interview  participants  were  airline  personnel  familiar  with  ADS-B,  either  
through operations or engineering (avionics).  Interviewees included operations 
directors, avionics managers, flight technical pilots, and ATC liaisons for airlines.  
Some airline interviews were conducted with only one employee, while in other 
interviews, several employees were present. 
 
4.2    Interview Method 
 
Focused interviews were conducted via telephone with airline personnel. Answers 
were recorded on tape and by typing on a computer.  In some cases, the taping 
mechanism did not work so only typed notes exist.  Some interviewees prepared 
written responses in addition to their phone interview responses. These were 
collected by the interviewer 
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via e-mail.  The interview questions were sent to the participants for review at least 
one day before the interview. 
Interviews were conducted between December 2007 and February 2008.   
Interviews usually lasted between one and two hours.  The MIT Committee On the 
Use of Human Experimental Subjects (COUHES) protocol was followed for 
interviews.  Several interview participants chose to keep their name and their airline 
name anonymous.   Several other interviewees asked for permission to use 
quotations.   Because a small pool of interview participants makes it easy to identify 
airlines if some data were attributed and others were not, all results are presented 
anonymously. 
 
4.3    Interview Questions 
 
The interview protocol covered general perceptions of ADS-B, ADS-B benefits, costs 
and barriers to equipage, current fleet status, equipage plans, and synthesis.  A 
short overview of ADS-B was provided in the interview protocol introduction.  A copy 
of the survey can be found in Appendix A of this thesis. 
The background section was used to gage an interviewee's level of familiarity 
with ADS-B. It then probed for perceptions of the technology and the NPRM. 
The benefits portion asked about potential benefits and benefit locations of ADS- 
B. In addition, it asked interviewees to judge the value of the benefits.  A standard 
set of benefits was not given to interview participants.   To  ensure  completeness  in  
answers,  the  interview  protocol  provided  a  framework  for  thinking  about  
possible  benefit  areas.   The  framework  asked  interviewees  to  think  about  
benefits  by  flight  regime  (terminal,  enroute,  non-radar  area,  surface)  and,  
within  each  flight  regime,  by function (ATC, AOC, cockpit).  The benefits section 
also asked about the utility of services offered only on the UAT link and the impact of 
network effects on airline equipage decisions. 
The  costs  and  barriers  portion  of  the  survey  asked  about  costs  and  
barriers  to  ADS-B  equipage.   It specifically addressed upgrade costs and asked 
about airline confidence in the FAA. The costs and barriers portion also asked about 
incentives for encouraging adoption. 
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Current status questions were asked to gain a better understanding of how 
airlines use their fleets and to assess the current state of airline equipage. 
The future technologies section asks about planned ADS-B In equipage and non- 
ADS-B technologies in which airlines might be investing.  The purpose of the future 
technologies section is to understand other equipment airlines will have in the near 
future, competing constraints on airline budgets, and what technologies ADS-B will 
compete with in providing benefits.   In addition, asking about future technologies 
gives insight into the criteria airlines use to make equipage decisions and how they 
value technology benefits. 
At the end of the interview, airlines were given the opportunity to synthesize their 
views provide suggestions regarding the administration of the SBS program. 
 
4.4    Analysis of Interview Data 
 
Several methods were used to parse the airline interview data.   The method used 
depended on how the questions were posed.   Some questions had uniform answers 
that were distinctly categorizable For example, airline equipage and future 
technology investment questions yielded statistics or a finite set of discrete answers. 
Responses to benefits and barriers questions were distilled using content  
analysis,  which  looked  at  the  frequency  and  intensity  of  responses.   General 
categories were designated to encompass more specific answers.   These 
categories were determined based upon accepted standards in air transportation.  In 
general, the categories are distinct in geography or phase of flight.   For example, 
continuous descent arrivals (CDAs) and closely spaced parallel approaches fall into 
the broader category of arrival and departure procedures.
 
 
 
 
 
 
  51 
4.5    Conclusions 
 
The methodology for airline interviews was presented.  An overview of airlines and 
type of airline personnel interviewed is given.  The interview protocol is introduced.  
The method for analyzing interview data is reviewed. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Interview Results 
 
The following chapter presents results of the airline interviews described in the 
Chapter four (Airline Interview Methodology) of this thesis.  The sections in this 
chapter correspond to sections of questions asked in the airline interview. 
The location of this chapter relative to the overall objective of this thesis is shown 
in Figure   5-1.  The data presented in this chapter will be used in the game theory 
and policy analysis of later chapters. 
 
5.1    Airline Perception of ADS-B 
 
Airlines  are  supportive  of  the  ADS-B  concept  because  they  view  it  as  a  
necessary  tool for modernizing the national air transportation system.  The airlines 
have been impacted by increased congestion in the NAS through delays and are 
concerned about 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1:  Thesis Map
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increasing fuel costs.  There is consensus amongst airlines that the air transportation 
system must be improved.  International ADS-B programs lend further credence to 
the domestic technology initiative.   However, some airlines are skeptical about the 
future success of the ADS-B program because of residual displeasure with past FAA 
technology implementation programs. 
There is significant variation in the level of airline knowledge about ADS-B. Some 
airlines have employees closely involved with technical and procedures standards 
development, sitting on FAA and RTCA committees.  For other airlines, knowledge 
of ADS-B is limited to press releases provided by the FAA. The range of familiarity 
with ADS-B led to a wide variety of answers regarding ADS-B benefits and 
equipage. 
 
5.2    Benefits 
 
Airlines are interested in benefits that will justify a business case for equipage. 
Airlines identified a variety of factors that contribute to a positive business case.  
Variation in responses aligned with differences in operations.  Major airlines and 
cargo operators cite fuel savings, capacity increases, and overall operation efficiency 
as key factors to a positive benefits case. Regional airlines garner indirect benefits 
from fuel and capacity  increases,  since  the  majors  pay  for  the  fuel  and  set  the  
schedule.   However,  more  efficient  operations  would  benefit  the  regionals  by  
making  them  more  competitive  in bidding for contracts.  Business jet owners are 
primarily interested in safety and efficiency benefits.  Although all operators are 
concerned about safety, safety benefits alone are not sufficient to justify a business 
case for equipage. 
There were a wide variety of benefits answers due to the diversity of knowledge 
and optimism among respondents.   Some respondents based their answers on the 
applications listed in the SBS Conops.  Others based their answers on the long term 
vision for ADS-B. Some respondents also constrained their answers to applications 
that they felt could be realistically accomplished by the FAA. 
Despite differences in factors that contribute to a positive business case, there is 
agreement on the types of applications and procedures that would provide benefits
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to airlines. Operational differences seemed to modulate the intensity of some 
preferences.  Applications cited as beneficial by the airlines can be divided into two 
categories- high benefits and lower benefits.   High benefits have a large direct 
impact on the company bottom line.  Lower benefits might have an indirect or 
smaller magnitude impact on the company bottom line.   High  benefit  applications  
tend  to  be  in  the  early  stages  of  development  and  require  capabilities  that  
have  not  yet  been  developed.  Lower benefit applications tend to be available for 
immediate use.  Often, these applications use technology or procedures that are  
already in place.  Figure  5-2 shows the beneficial applications cited by airlines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2:  Benefits Applications 
5.2.1    Primary Benefits 
 
Reduced Separation Standards 
 
All of the airlines mentioned reduced separation standards as the highest benefit 
application.  Reduced separation standards would decrease queuing delays, 
reducing fuel costs.  Theoretically, system capacity would increase as well.  There is 
disagreement about whether reduced separation standards are achievable and there 
are many ideas about how to achieve separation standards.  Some airlines believe 
that ADS-B Out alone will enable reduced separation standards.  Other airlines 
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believe that reduced separation standards will only come with ADS-B In and 
procedures development, so the benefit will be realized in the long term. 
Some airlines believe reduced separation can be achieved with just ADS-B Out 
because ADS-B offers higher fidelity data than radar.  Since it is a GPS-based 
system, ADS-B can offer a faster update rate and greater accuracy and integrity than 
radar.  Some airlines believe that reducing error in the data will result in decreased 
actual airplane separation, leading to airspace capacity increases.  Other airlines 
believe that better accuracy will provide sufficient justification for lowering separation 
standards.  However, many airlines are skeptical that ADS-B Out can satisfy the 
requirements needed to reduced separation standards.  Airlines expressed concern 
that the FAA's certification mechanisms will not be able to approve the reduced 
separation standards because they do not have precedent for such actions and are 
not equipped to make them. 
Several airlines suggested that reduced separation standards might be 
achievable with ADS-B In.   One  idea  is  that  ADS-B  In  will  enable  visual  flight  
rule  (VFR)  procedures in instrument flight rule (IFR) conditions.  This will require 
CDTI to aid the pilot in achieving visual awareness in instrument conditions. 
Another idea is reducing separation standards as part of a change to the air 
traffic control paradigm.  The new control paradigm would be based on either self-
separation or control by exception.  In both these paradigms, power and 
responsibility for separation is given to the pilots.  Under the current control 
paradigm, controllers have the responsibility of maintaining separation.   By contrast, 
in control by exception, controllers will intervene to issue commands only when 
necessary.  Some airlines believe that decreasing controller involvement decreases 
latency in the time to make and issue decisions.  This will allow airplanes to react 
more quickly to situations, thereby enabling reduced separation.  Proponents of 
greater pilot control acknowledge that decision support tools are crucial to the self 
separation functionality.  However, these decision support tools have not been 
developed or, in some cases, even envisioned. 
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About half of the major carriers are strongly opposed to self separation.  Some argue 
that pilots will not want to shoulder the liability that comes with maintaining 
separation.  Others argue that there is no reason to believe that pilots will separate 
airplanes at a lower distance than controllers.  The concern of the opposition stems 
from experience and perceived difficulty in changing user mindset during technology 
transitions. 
 
Arrival and Departure Procedures 
 
Arrival and departure procedures is another application with the potential to deliver 
high value benefits.  In particular, airlines would like to see capacity improvements 
on arrival.  There are several ideas for approach procedures.  Many of these ideas 
use  required  navigation  performance  (RNP)  technology  in  conjunction  with  
ADS-B  to  create new arrival routes.  Two arrival procedures that were cited as very 
high impact are Continuous Descent Approaches (CDAs) and closely spaced 
parallel approaches. 
CDAs are currently being tested by UPS at Louisville.  Airlines like CDAs 
because they offer fuel savings.  CDAs are also likely to receive operational approval 
because they do not require reductions in separation standards.   Furthermore,  
airlines  like  the  fact  that  the  development  work  is  being  done  by  another  
airline  (UPS).  Some airlines, however, are skeptical that CDAs will provide benefits 
in a mixed equipage environment.  Also, some CDA procedures might require ADS-
B In, which is expected to be expensive. 
Closely spaced parallel approaches would provide a high value benefit by  
increasing  capacity  and  reducing  delays  at  several  busy  and  constrained  
airports.   Examples include San Francisco (SFO), Seattle (SEA), Newark (EWR) 
and Boston (BOS). At  SFO,  for  instance,  low  visibility  due  to  fog  can  cut  the  
operating  capacity  of  the  airport in half.  However, closely spaced parallel 
approach would likely require CDTI to aid pilot navigation.  Some airlines believe 
ADS-B is not needed for closely spaced parallel approaches because Precision 
Runway Management (PRM) procedures are already available. 
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Surveillance Coverage in Non-Radar Areas 
 
An  application  related  to  reduced  separation  standards  is  surveillance  
coverage  in  current  non-radar  areas.   Examples of non-radar areas include 
mountainous areas (e.g. airports in Colorado) and over water areas (e.g.  Gulf of 
Mexico and the Western Atlantic).  Because ADS-B is cheaper to install and 
maintain than radar, it presents  an  opportunity  to  extend  the  surveillance  
capability  of  the  NAS.  Putting ADS-B in current non-surveillance areas would 
allow operation under IFR rules instead of procedural standards.  Because the 
application uses existing rules, a capacity increase can be achieved immediately 
with only ADS-B Out.  One benefit is increased en route throughput, since IFR 
allows for closer spacing of aircraft than procedural standards.  Another benefit is 
higher throughput at airports without radar surveillance. Increased throughput would 
occur as a result of switching from one-in one-out procedures to IFR procedures. 
Although ADS-B NRA offers immediate benefits, the magnitude of the benefits is 
lower than the benefits from reduced separation standards.   Legacy carriers and GA 
find ADS-B NRA beneficial, but regionals and low cost carriers (LCCs) do not.  This 
is because the regionals and LCCs interviewed tend to serve major cities and do not 
usually operate in non-radar airspace.  Furthermore, the economic value of remote 
locations to the regional airlines interviewed is low. Regionals worry that remote 
areas might not have the markets to support the increased frequency of service 
afforded by capacity improvements.  For the major airlines, benefits from ADS-B 
NRA may be mitigated by investments in other technologies and the nature of the 
airspace.  For example, the state government of Colorado has invested in 
multilateration because it has many mountainous airports and poor weather in the 
winter.  Therefore,  any  airlines  that  would  reap  benefits  from  ADS-B  NRA  in  
Colorado  might  receive  the  same benefits sooner from multilateration.  ADS-B 
NRA over water benefits may be constrained by neighboring foreign air traffic control 
areas.  For example, one airline  believes  that  ADS-B  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  will  
offer  lower  levels  of  benefits  than  those claimed by the FAA because it is 
constrained at one end by air traffic control in Mexico.  Even if en route capacity 
through the Gulf were to increase, there is no  guarantee  that  the  air  traffic  
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controllers  in  the  terminal  areas  in  Mexico  would  be  able to handle the 
additional traffic. 
 
5.2.2    Secondary Benefits 
 
Airlines mentioned several applications that could be implemented immediately 
because they only require ADS-B Out.  However, these benefits are of lower value 
than the benefits that come from applications using ADS-B In. 
Secondary  benefits  come  mostly  from  ground  operations  applications,  such  
as  streaming  ADS-B  data  into  the  Airline  Operations  Center  (AOC).  ADS-B 
data in the AOC is expected to provide operational efficiency and safety 
improvements.  For example, airlines might be able to improve airplane turn around 
time at their hubs if they had more accurate arrival information and a better view of 
gate and surface activities.  More accurate information would enable efficient 
dispatch of ground crew and gate assignment, resulting in faster overall turn-around.  
Other airlines envision being able to use the ADS-B data for push-back commands. 
The locations where airlines derive surface benefits differ.   Those  operating  at  
major  hubs  indicated  that  the  service  would  be  most  be  useful  at  the  large  
hubs,  since  tend  to  the  be  system  bottleneck.   Airlines with more operations in 
remote outputs felt the system would be more useful at the smaller airports instead 
of the major airports currently with radar surveillance. 
Not all airlines believe that AOC data will be beneficial.   One  airline  contends  
that  there  is  already  the  capacity  to  offer  better  data,  but  airlines  have  not  
asked  for it, indicating the benefit offers little value.  Data is currently fed into the 
AOC once every twelve seconds while radar data is updated every four seconds.  
Others airlines felt that Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System 
(ACARS) communications were sufficient.  Still other airlines have already invested 
heavily in ground multilateration systems and did not see a need for ADS-B. Some 
airlines did not find the application useful because they do not operate their own 
ground crew. 
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5.2.3    Benefits Locations 
 
Figure  5-3 shows locations where ADS-B would be most beneficial to airlines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3:  Benefit Locations 
 
Differences  in  operating  structure  contributed  to  differences  in  locations  
where  airlines would like to see benefits.  For example, most LCCs and regionals 
interviewed do not operate frequently in non-radar areas.   Therefore, they did not 
find non- radar area applications beneficial.  Conversely, airlines that do not have 
high density operations in busy terminal areas did not find terminal area applications 
to be high value. 
 
Terminal Areas 
 
There is agreement amongst airlines that terminal areas are in need of capacity and 
efficiency improvements.   Thirteen of fourteen airlines said ADS-B would have the 
biggest benefit in busy terminal areas, such as airline hubs.  Airlines feel that 
terminal areas are especially constrained.  Metropolitan areas cited include New 
York, Atlanta, Chicago, and Houston. 
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Non-Radar Areas 
 
Non-radar areas were cited by seven of the fourteen carriers interviewed.  In non-
radar areas, there is the potential for immediate efficiency gains with ADS-B Out 
because it would enable the use of IFR procedures, as opposed to procedural 
standards.  The airlines that did not find benefits in non-radar surveillance areas do 
not operate in that type of airspace.  Within non-radar airspace, different types of 
airspace and different regions were cited by the airlines.  Some airlines saw benefits 
at one-in one-out airports.  Other airlines cited benefits en route.  Non-radar regions 
where surveillance would be valuable include the mountains, the Gulf of Mexico, and 
the Western Atlantic.   Five  of  the  nine  major  carriers  also  mentioned  that  they  
are  equipping  for  Hudson Bay in Canada. 
Other than non-radar areas, airlines did not pinpoint specific en route areas 
where ADS-B would be beneficial. 
 
5.3    Costs and Barriers 
 
Airlines identified several barriers associated with ADS-B equipage.   Because  the  
primary  concern  of  the  airlines  is  getting  a  positive  cost  benefit  case  for  
equipage,  barriers tended to fall into two categories- those due to direct cost and 
those due to  uncertainty and risk.  Figure 5-4 lists the issues of greatest concern for 
the airlines. 
 
5.3.1    Costs 
 
Cost of equipage is a large concern for most airlines.  The primary costs stem from 
retrofitting existing fleets, not from changing existing orders.  Airlines are concerned 
because many of them have old fleets that will potentially require extensive retrofits.  
Many airlines cited concerns about lack of available capital for avionics investments 
due to recent bankruptcies and rising operations costs due to the high cost of jet 
fuel.  In addition, ADS-B faces competition for investment capital from other 
technologies that were on the FAA road map earlier and could provide immediate
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Figure 5-4:  Barriers 
 
benefits, such as precision based navigation (RNP and RNAV). Airlines in better 
financial positions are less concerned about equipage than those that are cash poor 
and have older fleets. 
For ADS-B Out, the largest up-front costs are expected to be for navigation 
(GPS), wiring changes, and additional transponders to meet DO260A standards.  
There is also cost associated with ground time and installation. Training costs are 
not expected to be significant for ADS-B Out. 
A significant expenditure is expected for ADS-B In equipage.  The displays 
needed for CDTI are expected to be very expensive.  It is also unclear how the data 
needed for ADS-B In will be displayed. 
Cost of fleet equipage will vary by airline.  Airlines with relatively young fleets  are  
likely  to  already  have  GPS,  so  upgrading  will  be  relatively  inexpensive  and  it  
will not take long to equip the entire fleet.  Airlines with older and larger fleets will 
need significantly more time to retrofit their fleets unless they accelerate their heavy 
maintenance cycle, which would be a costly endeavor.  Larger legacy carriers may 
also face significant costs from needing to do GPS upgrades on their fleets. 
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5.3.2    Uncertainties 
 
Uncertainty  and  risk  are  major  sources  of  concern  for  the  airlines.   Sources of 
uncertainty and risk include the FAA's track record with technology implementation, 
certification barriers, unclear information from the FAA, and difficulty in achieving 
system change. 
 
FAA Technology Implementation Record 
 
The airlines have been unhappy with past FAA technology implementation projects, 
leading to distrust of the FAA by the airlines.   Airlines cited Future Air Navigation 
System (FANS) and Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) as 
examples of technology initiatives abandoned by the FAA. Airlines were left with 
expensive equipment that could not be used.  Experience with FANS and CPDLC 
has made airlines wary of adopting technologies early for fear that investments will 
not garner returns.  Airlines stressed the need to see commitment to ADS-B from 
FAA leadership.  Airlines also want the FAA to commit to sustained funding for ADS-
B to shelter their avionics investments from political risk.  One airline interviewed 
believes the problems with previous technology initiatives are not a legitimate source 
of concern because the SBS program is being run by different people. 
However, FANS and CPDLC do serve as reminders of the difficulties of achieving 
system change.  In particular, difficulties come from the certification process and 
from changing system stakeholder mindset. 
 
Certification Difficulties 
 
Several airlines expressed concern about the FAA's ability to certify ADS-B avionics 
and to provide operational approvals for applications that will provide real benefits, 
such as reduced separation standards.  The FAA does not have experience with 
certification and operational approvals for changes of that are envisioned for ADS-B.  
Some airlines criticized the FAA's culture of safety for creating certification 
requirements that are too conservative and stringent.  In particular, required level of
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safety to several nines may prove difficult without data.   Airlines suggest that it may 
be better not to specify to the worst case, but instead to certify to the normal case 
and then find workarounds for anomalies. 
Airlines are concerned that different regional offices have different standards for 
operational approvals.  A configuration that has been approved for one airline may 
not be approved for another.   This may also lead to discrepancies regarding how 
procedures are developed.  For example, if one airline tests certain procedures, 
other airlines may not be able to use it because their specific regional office might 
not grant operational approval. The overriding concern with approvals and 
certification barriers is that they will increase the cost of avionics. 
 
Human Factors Issues 
 
Airlines  are  concerned  about  the  human  factors  issues  associated  with  
technology  transition.   In  particular,  they  mentioned  it  might  be  difficult  to  
change  controller  mindset to accommodate and reap benefits from the new 
technology.  Although air-  lines  have  not  seen  problems  with  controllers  
adapting  to  new  procedures  such  as  those for RNP, they are concerned about 
resistance to new procedures and an entirely new operating paradigm.  Airlines that 
have tried to implement new procedures at specific airports report initial hesitation 
from the controllers, but little resistance after the controllers became accustomed to 
the new procedures.  There is concern, however, that initial push-back will impede 
system change. 
Related to the issue of stakeholder mindset is a concern about ATC's ability to 
handle mixed-equipage situations.   Airlines say they are unwilling to equip early 
because benefits will be diminished by a mixed-equipage environment.  Some 
airlines believe that the cognitive complexity of handling mixed equipage will make it 
difficult to institute early adopter incentives such as preferential treatment. 
 
Lack of Information 
 
Another  source  of  uncertainty  for  the  airlines  is  a  perceived  industry-wide 
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confusion  about  ADS-B  and  lack  of  information  from  the  FAA.  Although some 
airlines closely involved with technology development know the exact technical 
requirements for ADS-B, airlines only peripherally involved with the technology 
complain of unclear technical standards.  Airlines have mentioned that the NPRM 
has inconsistent technical requirements.   Furthermore, the requirements for ADS-B 
In are unclear.  One airline lambasted the ADS-B In portion of the NPRM for being 
more of a vision statement than a proposed rule document.  Adding further to the 
confusion about technical standards is the fact that ADS-B is currently not available 
from the manufacturers.  This compounds confusion about the cost of ADS-B, 
meaning that airlines cannot even begin to consider making a business case or 
planning for equipage. 
In addition to confusion about technology standards, airlines are unclear about 
the FAA vision and ADS-B benefits.  Airlines want to see the FAA leadership commit 
to ADS-B. The fact that ADS-B has not percolated to all the FAA vision documents  
contributes  to  the  perceived  lack  of  dedication  to  the  program.   Although  it  is  
in  the NextGen and Operation Evolution Partnership (OEP) plans from 2008, ADS-B  
is  not  included  in  the  FAA  road  map  for  precision  based  navigation.   Airlines 
say that constantly changing technology initiatives from the FAA make it them to 
justify equipage cases to their finance departments. 
Airlines are also unclear about what applications will be offered via ADS-B, com-  
pounding  to  the  difficulty  of  making  a  business  case  for  the  technology.   
Although  a list of applications is specified in the SBS Conops,  some application 
descriptions  are very  vague  and  it  is  not  clear  how  they  will  be  implemented.   
Furthermore,  it  is  difficult  to  quantify  the  benefits  based  upon  the  application  
descriptions  in  the  Conops. 
 
5.4    Equipment Usage 
 
Most airlines do not designate planes for specific routes domestically. One exception 
is that some airlines designate planes for over-water operations.  The implication is 
that airlines operate interchangeable fleets.  Therefore, they prefer to institute 
equipage decisions for their entire fleets, instead of for specific subfleets.
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For ADS-B, this means that benefits should either be available throughout the 
NAS or localized in areas accessed by the majority of the fleet.  Examples of 
localized  areas  include  airline  hubs  or  a high  density  operations  regions,  such  
as  New York.  Airline hubs and high density operations regions would theoretically 
provide benefits with enough value to justify an entire fleet equipage. 
Airlines report it will take between five and seven years to equip their fleets. Most 
traditional carriers have a low percentage of their fleet equipped with GPS.  
Figure   5-5 shows the percent of GPS equipage in fleets of major airlines, 
including low cost carriers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5:  GPS Equipage at Major Airlines 
 
Most carriers have plans to upgrade GPS on their fleets within the next five to ten 
years.  LCCs and regional airlines participating in this interview tend to have a higher 
number of GPS equipped aircraft, because their fleets are younger than those  of the 
legacy carriers. 
Equipping with GPS is seen by the major airlines as method of laying the ground- 
work for ADS-B equipage.  Furthermore, GPS is seen as an enabler of other 
technologies.  With the exception of Horizon Airlines, airlines are not equipping with 
GPS with WAAS. However, according to the NPRM, WAAS is the only GPS system 
that will meet DO260A requirements.  Airlines are opposed to WAAS because they 
believe that it will be expensive, it is not the global standard (since it is only available 
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in the U.S.), and they believe that it is not necessary for ADS-B Out.  WAAS is also 
not being offered by any airplane manufacturers.  By the time WAAS is needed, 
some airlines hope that the Galileo system will be functioning in Europe, so the 
industry can move to a global GPS augmentation standard. 
NavCanada's mandate for ADS-B over Hudson Bay has pushed some airlines to 
begin equipping with DO260.  Of the airlines equipping with DO260, some claim to 
have sufficient equipage to make DO260A essentially plug and play.  Other airlines  
do  not  know  what  is  needed  to  be  considered  DO260A  compliant.   Airlines 
have suggested that the FAA should give credit for DO260 equipage because that is 
the European and Australian standard.   In addition, they argue that DO260A is not 
needed for ADS-B Out.  The airlines believe the FAA should implement less 
stringent  equipage  standards  for  ADS-B  Out  and  specify  requirements  for  
ADS-B  In  later,  when it is deployed.  This is because airlines are concerned that 
current technology  will be outdated by the time ADS-B In is implemented and do not 
want to spend  money now for technology that will not be used. 
Most airplanes that operate domestically do not have Mode S ES transponders.  
Those operating in Europe do have ES transponders.  However, the data streams in 
those airplanes may not be correct for DO260A compliance. 
No airplanes are currently equipped with DO260A. Some airlines mentioned that 
they have all the wiring in place for DO260A, but do not have the STC for 260A.  
UPS is expecting to receive the STC for DO260Afivery soon. 
 
5.5    Incentives 
 
Figure   5-6 shows the incentives that airlines reported they would like to see with 
ADS-B. 
All of the airlines agreed that a mandate for ADS-B is a good idea.  The airlines 
do not expect much objection to the mandate because the industry views ADS-B as 
inevitable.  Airlines differed on the timing of the mandate.  Some airlines suggested 
accelerating the current mandate because it would decrease their investment risk 
and 
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Figure 5-6:  Incentives 
 
would lead  to  an  accelerate  accrual  of  benefits.   Other  airlines  felt  the  time  
frame  for  the  current  mandate  was  good.   Airlines  opposing  the  mandate  
caution  that  a  mandate  must  accommodate  airline  maintenance  cycles.   
Otherwise, the mandate could create significant disruptions to service and economic 
losses for airlines. 
A mandate is viewed positively by many airlines because it creates a guarantee 
for system-wide equipage and reduces investment risk.  It also shows that the FAA 
is committed to the project.  Building trust amongst stakeholders is important for the 
FAA because of their poor track record with previous technology implementations.  A 
mandate also ensures that airspace users who do not receive a positive cost-benefit 
from ADS-B (such as general aviation users) will equip.  One potential problem of a 
mandate is that it may create difficulties in attracting early adopters, causing an 
effect where, if the benefit is low, everybody waits until the last minute to equip. 
Beyond a mandate, airlines suggested direct financing would incentivize them to 
equip.   One  airlines  said  that  if  the  benefits  exist,  monetary  incentives  would  
not  be necessary.  However, airlines with larger fleets believe that the FAA should 
fund implementation of ADS-B avionics out of fairness.  They reason that if airplanes 
are considered part of the air transportation system, then avionics should be funded 
with the rest of the system.  One airline mentioned that federal funding would help 
them overcome all reservations about equipage.  If the FAA were to fund their
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equipage, the airline would equip, regardless of their trust in the ultimate success of 
the project.  Preferential treatment garnered mixed support from the airlines.  Those 
opposed to preferential treatment were concerned about the logistics of 
implementing it and were pessimistic about its feasibility.  Airlines disliked an 
exemption system.  One airline suggested the FAA could internalize positive 
externalities created by early adopters. 
 
5.6    Alternative Technologies 
 
Many airlines mentioned that they were investing in technologies other than ADS-B.  
These technologies compete with ADS-B avionics for airline resources.  Some of 
these technologies may provide benefits that overlap with ADS-B, further 
disincentivizing airlines from equipage.  For example, RNP may enable new arrival 
routes that would ease the strain on some busy airports. 
A graph of technologies in which airlines are currently investing is shown in 
Figure  5-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-7:  Alternative Technology Investments - All Carriers 
 
It is interesting to view the breakdown of investment in alternative technologies 
by air carrier type.  For reference, there were a total of five legacy carriers, three 
LCCs, three regionals, and two cargo carriers.  All major airlines (legacy carriers and
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LCCs) are investing in RNP. The airlines mentioned that RNP is a higher funding 
priority than ADS-B because the technology is perceived as being more mature.  In 
addition, RNP will offer some benefits similar to ADS-B. It will enable more precise 
spacing  of  airplanes,  potentially  opening  more  routes  into  congested  airports.   
However,  it  should  be  noted  that  RNP  is  only  a  partial  solution.   ADS-B will 
be needed for lateral separation.   In addition, PRM procedures may enable landings 
at airports with closely spaced runways.  If these technologies are readily available 
and offer a limited version of ADS-B benefits, airlines may be less likely to adopt 
ADS-B early. 
EFB investment comes primarily from regional carriers, which are interested in 
the weather functionality. Regionals are interested in investing in EFBs because one 
of the competitors in the group pioneered the use of the technology and has 
demonstrated benefits from using it.  Regionals may be more interested in the 
weather functionality from EFBs than majors because majors already receive 
commercial weather services, either through ACARS or through proprietary systems.  
In addition, some low cost carriers are equipped with Live TV feeds and have been 
exploring the possibility of using these feeds for weather information. 
Alternative technologies mentioned by a few of the airlines include CPDLC and 
multilateration.  While CPDLC is lower priority than ADS-B for most airlines, it is a 
priority for airlines with extensive operations in Europe, where the technology is 
more mature. 
Multilateration has been cited as an alternative to the surface application benefits 
of ADS-B. Some airlines have invested heavily in multilateration systems at their 
hubs.  This detracts from the surface benefits of ADS-B. This hurts ADS-B because 
although surface benefits are small, they are easy to implement.   Some local 
governments, such as the state of Colorado, have also been investing in 
multilateration systems.  The multilateration system in Colorado may impact the 
magnitude of non-radar area benefit afforded by ADS-B if it is available sooner and 
for less of a cost to the airlines. 
It is important to note that the only airline considering equipage with ADS-B In is 
UPS. ADS-B In is viewed as too far in the future and the technology standards are 
considered to be too uncertain to merit equipage consideration.
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5.7    Synthesis/Recommendations 
 
There was consensus on ways in which airlines would like to see improvements in 
the SBS program.   Many  airlines  mentioned  they  wanted  to  see  buy-in  from  
the  FAA  leadership, particularly from the division responsible for operation 
procedures.  Many  airlines  are  dissatisfied  with  FAA  progress  toward  delivering  
operational  benefits,  despite the fact the agency has concrete plans for ground 
infrastructure.  Buy-in from FAA leadership is key because the airlines are seeking 
guarantees that their equipage investments will provide a return. 
A second point pushed by airlines is the need for greater stakeholder 
involvement in the ADS-B program.   To  engage  stakeholders,  it  was  proposed  
that  airlines,  pilots,  and  controllers  should  be  involved  in  the  applications  
development.   Airlines  also  wanted  more  transparent  information  about  the  
cost  of  equipage  and  technical standards for ADS-B. Furthermore, airlines wanted 
proven benefits.  Trials were suggested as a method for proving the benefits of ADS-
B. The FAA has conducted limited ADS-B trials in the Capstone program in Alaska.  
However, airlines want trials with commercial carriers in more realistic operating 
environments.  Airlines also stressed the importance of making the trial data 
available to all users. 
 
5.8    Conclusion 
 
Results of the airline interviews were presented.  It was found that differences in 
airline operating structures led to different perceptions of benefits, barriers, and 
overall knowledge of ADS-B. Nevertheless, there was agreement on the highest 
value benefits and issues of greatest concern for the airlines.  The three highest 
benefit applications for airlines are reduced separation standards, arrival and 
departure procedures, and surveillance in non-radar areas.   The highest benefit 
locations are terminal areas.  There was less agreement on benefits in non-radar 
and surface locations.  Airlines are most concerned about cost of equipage, potential 
certification difficulties, FAA commitment to the program, and information about 
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required equipage, costs, and benefits. The regionals interviewed have a higher 
proportion of their fleet GPS equipped than the majors.  For incentives, all airlines 
support a mandate, while many also like cash.   For  alternative  technologies,  the  
majors  are  all  investing  in  RNP  while  the  regionals are all either investing in or 
intending to invest in EFBs. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Analysis of Market Failures in 
Technology Adoption 
 
This  chapter  presents  a  game  theoretic  analysis  of  the  data  presented  in  
Chapter  five (Interview Results).  Free market conditions are assumed for all the 
games, representing the situation of voluntary early equipage of ADS-B by the 
airspace users.  Market failures that occur in ADS-B implementation under free 
market conditions are identified as a result of the analysis. 
The four games described in Chapter three of this thesis (Market Failures 
Framework) are played.  These include three static games between:  major airlines, 
major airlines and other airspace users, major airlines and the FAA. A dynamic 
game is also played between major airlines and the FAA. 
The location of this chapter relative to the overall objective of this thesis is shown 
in Figure   6-1.  Insights from the analysis in this chapter will inform evaluation of 
potential government policies in later chapters. 
 
6.1    Airline to Airline Game 
 
In the game between airlines, each agent has two choices, equip or don't equip.   
Each  agent  has  a  private  monetary  payoff  (P)  and  a  monetary  cost  (C)  
associated  with  equipage.  If one agent equips but the other does not, the 
unequipped agent will still.
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Figure 6-1:  Thesis Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2:  Airline Game 
garner a benefit ( ) even if they choose not to equip with ADS-B. This represents the 
externalities that arise from the network effects and the public goods characteristics 
of ADS-B. There is an additional benefit (  ) that arises when all agents decide to 
equip. 
Based on the variable definitions, an airline's private benefit of equipping would be 
P-C.  If  all  airlines  equip,  the  payoff  would  be  an  individual  payoff  plus  a  net  
externality.  So, in the (equip, equip) case, the net payoff would be P - C + ε + γ 
The externality factors are defined to always be positive (ε > 0 and γ > 0).  The 
private benefit (P-C) can either be positive or negative. 
Figure  6-2 shows the 2x2 game as defined for airlines. 
Assume the game is symmetric between major airlines. This means that P1 = P2,
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C1 = C2, and  ε1 = ε2.  A symmetry assumption is a fairly accurate representation of 
payoffs because there is a high level of agreement on benefits in the airlines survey.  
The assumption of symmetric costs might not be exactly accurate.  The airline 
survey  found  significant  variation  in  airline  fleet  equipage,  particularly  in  GPS  
equipage.  Since GPS comprises the bulk of the ADS-B Out equipage cost, this 
indicates costs of equipage may vary widely from airline to airline. 
Under the symmetric assumption, the game changes to the one shown in Figure 
6-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3:  Symmetric Airline Game 
 
According to the airline surveys, P-C is an unknown to many airlines and others 
consider it to be negative.   For the game, assume P - C  <  0.   Although   private 
benefits are negative, assume that ADS-B still benefits airlines as a group.  
Therefore,  P - C + ε +  γ  > 0.   This  game  takes  on  the  form  of  a  coordination  
game,  which  has two Nash equilibria - (equip, equip) and (don't equip, don't equip).  
The solution (equip,  equip) is  Pareto  dominant.   However,  the  responses  from  
the  airline  survey  indicate that, currently, airlines are more likely to select the (don't 
equip, don't equip)  solution.  This can be seen in the airline's insistence that the 
benefits must justify the costs before they will equip and that the applications 
currently offered by the FAA do not deliver sufficient benefits.  Although the airlines 
are likely to receive a net positive value from equipping, the small private benefit of 
equipping makes it unlikely that airlines will want to equip.  This is an example of a 
public good market failure.  Two major factors contribute to the public goods market 
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failure.  The first factor is that the value of private benefits is too low, creating a 
negative cost benefit case.  This is reflected in the airline assertions that the current 
set of applications offered in the SBS conops do not align with airline criteria for 
highest benefit applications.  The airlines would like applications that offer fuel, 
efficiency, and cost savings, which come from reduced separation standards and 
arrival and departure procedures. The current SBS conops applications primarily 
offer benefits in situational awareness and safety.  While these benefits are 
important, they are public goods and do not contribute to creating positive business 
cases for individual airlines. 
The second factor stems from the high cost of technology development faced by 
early adopters.   Interview data and feedback from regionals indicates that major 
airlines likely to be early adopters of technologies championed by the government. 
The overwhelming concern regarding certification expressed by the major carriers 
reflects their role as early adopters.  By contrast, none of the regionals were 
concerned about certification.   Because  major  carriers  tend  to  be  early  
adopters,  they  are  likely  to  incur costs from pioneering technology development in 
additional to simple equipage  costs.  In particular, for a nascent technology like 
ADS-B, airlines would likely test applications for approvals.  In essence, as early 
adopters, major carriers are likely to create an externality that leads to low private 
payoffs, creating a situation where the non-Pareto optimal equilibrium is selected. 
 
6.2    Airline to Other Users Game 
 
The airline to other airspace user game is an asymmetric game.  Figure   6-4 shows 
the airline to other airspace user game. 
In  this  game,  in  contrast  to  the  game  between  major  carriers,  major  
carriers  are represented as a group, not as individual entities.  Therefore PAC 
represents the payoff to the large domestic carrier industry.  As with the previous 
game, there are externalities that arise from mixed and homogeneous equipage 
situations. 
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Figure 6-4:  Airline to Other Airspace User 
 
Data from the airline interviews shows a skewed distribution of costs and benefits 
between major carriers and other airspace users because the user groups value 
benefits differently.  The regional airlines interviewed in this study fly only to major 
cities and do not spend a lot of time out of radar range.  As such, they do not value 
the non-radar applications as highly as major carriers.  In addition, regional carriers 
interviewed do not pay for gas or set their own schedules.  The fuel costs and 
scheduling responsibilities are set by the majors for whom they contract.  As such, 
regionals do not value applications that provide fuel savings and increased airspace 
capacity as highly as the majors.  Applications that offer fuel savings and capacity 
increases may make the regionals more competitive when bidding for contracts, but 
do not directly impact their bottom line.  Based on the rate of regional equipage with 
EFBs, it seems that weather services might be more valuable to the regionals. 
The operating structure of GA is drastically different from that of airlines.  As 
shown in the interviews, airlines value efficiency and fuel savings.  Recreational 
users, on the other hand, tend to value safety and information applications, such as 
weather services.  [20] 
Assuming the cost of regional and major airline equipage is comparable, there is 
a case of asymmetric payoffs.  Because the type of benefits targeted by the ADS-B  
program  do  not  strongly  appeal  to  the  regionals  interviewed,  they  may  prefer  
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not equipping.   In this case, only one Nash equilibrium may exist.   If one agent has 
a  strong preference for not equipping, the only dominant solution to the problem 
may  be the (don't equip, don't equip) strategy. 
An asymmetry in costs between majors and regionals can also be introduced to 
the game.  The regionals interviewed have newer airplanes that would be easier to 
retrofit than the airplanes owned by the majors.  In addition, as mentioned 
previously, majors often absorb development costs of new technologies and 
procedures.  As such, the cost of equipage to regionals is likely to be lower than for 
the majors (CAC > CGA). 
Therefore,  assuming that the small payoff to regionals is balanced by the large  cost 
incurred by the majors (PAC -  CAC  ≈ PGA - CGA),  two Nash equilibria may  exist-  
either  both  players  equip  or  they  both  do  not  equip.   Based on the data, it 
seems that neither player is particularly keen on equipping.  This can be attributed to 
information asymmetries, which make the non-Pareto optimal solution risk dominant. 
In particular, regionals are generally less informed about a technology than the 
majors.  As such, the airlines do not know what types of cost-benefit cases the 
regionals are likely to make.  Therefore, uncertainty increases due to the information 
asymmetry, making the don't equip decision risk dominant. 
 
6.3    Airline to FAA Game 
 
Two games can be played for the airline to FAA interaction.  First, there is a static 
game, representing the first equipage decision.  An extensive form game is also 
played representing the multiple equipage process proposed for ADS-B. 
 
6.3.1    Static Game 
 
For the static game, the airline player represents airlines as a whole.  The airlines 
have two decisions- equip or don't equip.  The FAA also has two decisions - invest or 
don't invest in ADS-B. Define FAA investment in ADS-B to mean delivery of 
infrastructure, applications, and procedures.  Define a payoff variable (P) and a cost 
variable (C) for each player.  Furthermore, because payoff represents aggregate  
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payoffs for the airline industry, assume that P - C > 0 for both airlines and the FAA. 
The condition for positive payoff is that both airlines are equipped and the FAA has 
invested in ADS-B.  Assume that in the mixed solution case (don't equip, invest) and 
(equip, don't invest), private payoff is zero (P  = 0).  For the (don't equip, don't invest) 
solution set, define the benefit to be zero.  This assumes future possible negative 
consequences from not modernizing the air transportation system are neglected.  
The FAA game is shown in Figure 6-5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-5:  Airline to FAA 
 
This game has two Nash equilibria - (equip, invest) and (don't equip, don't 
invest).  The solution (equip, invest) Pareto dominates.   However, according to the 
airline survey, it is unlikely that airlines will choose the (equip, invest) solution under 
market conditions.  If the airlines strongly prefer the don't equip solution, the game 
shows that the likely dominant equilibrium is (don't equip, don't invest). 
Airlines report the (don't equip, don't invest) may dominate because of a 
perceived asymmetry in costs and benefits.  Airlines believe that they are generating 
a positive externality for the FAA by equipping with ADS-B. They argue that the FAA 
would receive cost savings by adopting ADS-B because ground stations are 
approximately one- fiftieth the cost of radar stations.  [15] However, the FAA 
contends that ADS-B  will  provide  airlines  with  operational  benefits,  which  will  
result  in  significant  cost  savings. 
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Data from the FAA's draft regulatory impact analysis, shown in Figure 6-6 shows 
that both the FAA and airlines are correct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-6:  FAA Draft Impact Analysis Results [24] 
 
The analysis shows that ADS-B will lower the cost of surveillance for both airlines 
and the FAA. Based on this FAA analysis, it seems that a market failure is unlikely to 
occur. 
A market failure does occur because of a difference in expected time for return 
on investment and airline distrust of the FAA. While both parties make significant 
investments for infrastructure at the beginning of the project, they have very different 
time scales for return on investment.  According to the airline survey, airlines have 
return on investment timeframes that vary between one and five years.  
Governments, on the other hand, can afford to wait longer for a return on 
investment.  The FAA the estimate of benefits is based on a twenty year time frame, 
the lifetime of the project.  Furthermore, the FAA impact analysis expects the 
majority of benefits at the end of the program, when all users are equipped and 
ADS-B In has been implemented.  Considered  in  an  airline  return  on  investment  
(ROI)  time  frame,  the  high  initial  investments in avionics and minimal benefits in 
the early years of the program may  indeed create a negative business case for the 
airlines. 
The airlines distrust that the FAA will deliver the level of benefits claimed in their 
draft impact analysis.  This distrust is due to a perception that the FAA has difficulty 
in completing technology initiatives.  Therefore, the airlines are creating a business  
case  on  a  shorter  time  scale  and  discounting  the  value  of  possible  future  
benefits  due  to  distrust  of  the  FAA.  Due  to  different  time  frames  used  for  
their  respective  individual business cases, there may indeed be a misalignment of 
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Figure 6-7:  Differences in FAA and Airline Expected ROI Time 
 
costs and benefits for airlines and the FAA that leads to market failure.  This 
scenario is illustrated in Figure  6-7. 
 
Risk Dominance 
 
The  long  time  frame  to  significant  benefits  makes  the  non-Pareto  optimal  
solution  potentially  risk  dominant.   In particular, the condition for risk dominance is 
PATCPAC - PACCATC - PATCCAC > 0.  Assuming payoffs and costs and symmetric 
between the FAA and air carriers as a whole, the condition for risk dominance 
becomes 2C ≥ P.  This means that the payoff would need to be at least twice the 
cost of equipage in order for the Pareto optimal solution to be risk dominant.  Based 
on airline feedback regarding benefits, it seems that the current set of applications 
offered by the FAA is unlikely to meet that criterion.  Although higher levels of 
benefits may  be offered in the future, those applications do not fall in the time frame 
necessary to  create a business case for equipage in the immediate future. 
The  underlying  cause  of  system  risk  stems  from  airline  uncertainty  about  
the  FAA's ability to complete the project and deliver benefits.  The uncertainty 
comes  from  perceived  institutional  failures  in  the  regulatory  arm  of  the  FAA  
that  aspects  the agency's performance as a market entity.  In the case of ADS-B, 
one institutional failure that adds risk to the system is organizational processes. 
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Organizational Process Failures 
 
Organizational  process  failures  for  the  government  stem  from  certification,  as  
well  as from management of system transition.  Organizational process failures add 
risk and decrease the value of the airline equipage case by increasing the time 
needed to complete a project.   With  increased  time  to  delivery  of  benefits,  the  
benefits  shift  beyond a reasonable timeframe for return on investment for airlines. 
Management  of  the  system  transition  is  difficult  for  the  government  
because  is  has  not  recently  implemented  a  change  on  the  scale  of  ADS-B.  
The  magnitude  of  the  system  change  and  the  voluntary  equipage  aspect  of  
ADS-B  makes  it  unique.  Previous  wide-scale  technology  initiatives,  such  as  
TCAS,  have  been  driven  by  a  strong safety argument, which justified a mandate.  
Voluntary equipage means that the government must manage stakeholder needs 
and expectations while meeting its flown performance objectives.   Furthermore, the 
system-wide nature of the change means that there are many stakeholders with 
potentially different interests to balance.  Because change of the magnitude and type 
of ADS-B is so rare, the government does  not  have  well  established  standards  
and  methods  for  balancing  the  demands  of  so  many stakeholders, leading to 
organizational process failures. 
Several airlines voiced concerns regarding FAA certification and operational 
approval processes.   In  particular,  airlines  fear  that  the  constraints  of  the  
approvals  process  will  prevent  the  implementation  of  ADS-B  applications  that  
will  delivery  high  value  benefits.   Furthermore, airlines fear that the lengthy 
approvals process, coupled with the fast pace of technology development, will 
render technologies obsolete before they receive approval, creating wasted use of 
resources.  Specific areas that concerned the airlines included meeting safety 
requirements with new procedures and avionics and receiving operational approval 
for individual fleet equipage.  As a basis for their concerns, airlines cited the RNAV 
and RNP program, which have been slow to deliver beneficial procedures. 
Analysis shows that the scope of changes envisioned for ADS-B would required 
complex coordination and intensive analysis to gain approval.  In particular, analysis 
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must be conduced in several operating performance areas, including avionics, 
ground  infrastructure, air to ground interface of data integration, and operational 
procedures.  For each operating performance area, safety analyses require technical 
expertise from several stakeholder groups, including air traffic control and airspace 
users.  It is  noted  that  a  large  amount  of  analysis  is  required  to  prove  
systems  meet  performance requirements.  [23] The complexity of operational 
approvals indicates there is a potential for organizational process failure. 
 
6.3.2    Dynamic Game 
 
The  ADS-B  program,  as  proposed  by  the  FAA,  has  a  minimum  of  two  
equipage  steps- one to equip for ADS-B Out and one to equip for ADS-B In.  More 
decision points may be added depending on whether the FAA will allow the DO260 
standard, with equipment upgrades to DO260A for ADS-B In, and further equipment 
upgrades accommodate new capabilities.  A dynamic game can be used to simulate 
multiple step equipages. 
An  extensive  form  game  demonstrates  why  airlines  are  opposed  to  a  
multiple  step  equipage.   Figure   6-8  shows  a  dynamic  game  between  the  FAA  
and  airlines  represented in extensive form. 
Each node represents either an equipage decision point for the airlines or an 
investment decision point for the FAA.  The game assumes four decision points- two 
by the airlines and two by the FAA. The FAA's first decision would represent their 
initial ground infrastructure deployment and group of applications.  The airline's first 
decision represents equipage with ADS-B Out.  The FAA's second decision point 
represents implementation of ADS-B In applications.  The airline's second decision 
represents a second equipage for ADS-B In.  At each decision point, there is a 
probability that the user will choose to not equip or invest, thereby ending the 
program.  Assume airlines will choose to equip with probability   .  Assume the FAA 
will choose to invest with probability   .  The probabilities of equipage and investment 
represent the coordination effort required at each decision point.  Each coordination 
effort is analogous to playing the static games shown above.  Payoffs are shown at 
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Figure 6-8:  Dynamic Game:  FAA v.  Airlines 
 
the terminus of branches of the tree.  Full benefits cannot be achieved unless the full 
chain of positive investment and equipage decisions is followed. 
The multiple step game shows that multiple equipages add risk and uncertainty 
to the system because probabilities associated with choices at each step are 
multiplicative.  Because probabilities are less than one, the chances of achieving the 
optimal end state diminish with every additional branch in the decision tree.  Initial 
investment risk is compounded at decision points because airlines are not certain 
that the final goal will be attained.  Therefore, multiple decision points make it less 
likely airlines will make the significant up-front investment necessary to equip with 
ADS-B. 
The  risk  at  each  decision  point  is  particularly  significant  when  considering  
the  FAA  is  tied  to  a  regulatory  body  that  is  also  subject  to  institutional  
failures.   An institutional failure likely to occur in the multiple step decision game is 
bureaucratic interests and politics. 
In particular, sustained funding and government support for ADS-B is a 
significant concern of airlines.  Airlines cite failures of technology initiatives such as
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CPDLC as a basis for their worries.  Research of multinational infrastructure 
programs has validated airline concerns, showing the fragility of government funding 
for infrastructure type projects.  Rogolf has shown in game theoretic analysis that 
when pressured  with an election cycle, governments will choose to allocate 
resources to projects that  can  produce  immediate  results  in  order  to  win  votes  
rather  than  to  long  term  infrastructure  projects.   [31]  Even  discounting  the  
effect  of  election  cycles,  sustained  government funding is difficult to achieve in 
the face of competing interests, such as  health care and education.  The long time 
of an infrastructure project exposes it to greater risk of failure. 
There is significant airline concern over the risk of program failure presented by 
funding cycles.  The concern can be seen in airline responses that called for buy-in 
from FAA leadership and change being driven from the top.  The sentiment amongst 
airlines is that having leadership champion the program will provide more stability 
and certainty for sustained funding.  Some airlines suggested the FAA should 
accelerate the mandate for ADS-B, provided the benefits exist.  Accelerating the 
mandate  would  decrease  the  risk  of  project  failure  because  it  would  provide  
fewer  funding  decision points at which the project could fail. 
 
6.4    Conclusion 
 
Through a game theoretic analysis of airline interview data, several market failures 
were shown to exist for ADS-B technology implementation under free market 
conditions.  Between major airlines, there is likely to be a public goods failure, where 
the individual benefit from equipage does not justify the cost.   This can be attributed 
to the nature of applications offered by the current SBS Conops and the time frame 
during which airlines seek a return on investment.  Between major airlines and other 
airspace users, there is likely to be a market failure resulting from asymmetry of 
costs and benefits and asymmetry of information.  Asymmetries in costs and benefits 
come  from  different  roles  that  the  airspace  users  play  in  technology  adoption,  
with  the  legacy carriers traditionally as early adopters and the regionals traditionally 
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as late adopters.  Between the airlines and the FAA, there is also a perceived 
asymmetry of costs and benefits, which stems from differences in acceptable time 
frames for return on investment.  In addition, a market failure is likely to occur due to 
risk dominance.  Risk  in  the  system  comes  from  institutional  failures  in  
organizational  processes  at  the FAA regulatory arm.  In addition, for a dynamic 
game, risk naturally arises from multiple equipage decision steps. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Policies 
 
Market failures suggest a need for government intervention.   In theory, the role of 
government is to correct market failures, creating conditions that will drive the market 
to an efficient equilibrium.  In this chapter, potential government actions to correct 
ADS-B market failures are suggested and evaluated.  However, as shown in Chapter 
six (Analysis of Market Failures in Technology Adoption), government intervention 
may not always be effective because government is subject to institutional failures. 
The location of this chapter relative to the overall objective of this thesis is shown 
in Figure  7-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1:  Thesis Map 
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7.1    Policy Mechanisms 
 
A framework for studying government mechanisms pertaining to air transportation 
was developed by Marais and Weigel (2006).  Government actions are grouped into 
four categories, which include infrastructure development support, increasing 
technology value, positive incentives, and mandates or putative measures.  [21] 
Based on  the feedback from the airline interviews, for ADS-B, it may be appropriate 
to separate  mandates  from  putative  measures,  resulting  in  five  categories  of  
government  mechanisms.  The mechanisms are shown in Figure 7-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2:  Mechanisms for Technology Transition [21] 
 
Infrastructure development means ensuring that the technology is available and 
accessible to users.  It includes physical deployment of ground infrastructure, 
certification, and development and testing of new procedures.  For ADS-B, 
infrastructure  would  include  ground  stations,  ATC  controller  interfaces,  
applications  and  procedures. 
There are three ways to increase technology value.  The public goods benefits 
can  be  increased,  leading  to  an  increased  technology  value  across  the  
system.   Or,  the  private  goods  benefits  of  the  technology  can  be  increased,  
creating  higher  benefits  for  each  individual  user.   In  addition,  the  timeframe  to  
accrual  of  benefit  can  be  decreased, creating benefits within an acceptable time 
for return on investment for  the airlines. 
 
Positive incentives are tools available to the government that can be used to  
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modulate the value of a technology.  These tools offer benefits beyond the scope of 
benefits that can be provided by technology alone.  Positive incentives can be used 
to deliver  benefits  in  a  return  on  investment  timeframe  acceptable  for  airline  
business  cases  if applications development takes too long.  For ADS-B, positive 
benefits that have been suggested include cash payments to airlines, loans, tax 
credits, and preferential treatment measures. 
Mandates are a way of guaranteeing full equipage and reducing investment risk.  
Mandates include rules requiring equipage of ADS-B.  Mandates can be applied to 
either to the entire airspace or just to specific airspaces.  For example, the FAA can 
choose to require ADS-B into all class B airspace, which would force most airlines 
into compliance.  By decreasing risk, mandates may shift the airline cost benefit 
case to show returns within an acceptable time period. 
Putative measures are a way to tax noncompliance.  Putative measures can also 
include taxes for non-compliance, or exclusionary airspace restrictions.  Putative 
measures can be used to shift the cost-benefit analysis for airlines by increasing the 
cost of noncompliance to an unacceptable level.   It  is  interesting  to  note  that  
putative  measures  and  positive  incentives  acts  in  opposite  ways.   Positive 
incentives induce users to equip by adding benefit while putative measures induce 
users to equip to by increasing the cost of non-compliance. 
The  FAA  has  already  implemented  several  policies  that  align  with  the  
Marais-  Weigel framework.  The FAA began infrastructure development through the 
contract for ground station deployment, awarded to ITT in August of 2007.  Ground 
infrastructure deployment is expected to begin in 2010 and finish by 2014.  In 
addition, the FAA has taken steps toward a mandate for ADS-B out by issuing a 
NPRM in August of 2007.  According to the NPRM, a mandate for ADS-B Out in the 
NAS will take effect in 2020.  The FAA has sought to increase technology value to 
GA users with a UAT link decision.  Because GA find weather and information 
services most valuable, these services will be provided on through UAT. However, 
the ultimate value of the FIS-B services is debatable because of the development of 
alternative commercial services, such as XM radio. 
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Despite the actions of the FAA, data from the airlines shows the system is still 
prone to market failures.   This suggests  the  FAA  should  take further  steps  to  
correct  these  sources  of  market  failure.   This conclusion is validated by airline 
survey data, which indicates airlines believe the FAA has not done enough to 
advance the deployment of ADS-B technology. 
 
7.2    Policy Selection Criteria 
 
The market failures identified in Chapter six present criteria for objectives of 
government policy.  The market failures identified include: 
• Public Goods Failure  
• Asymmetry of Costs and Benefits  
• Asymmetry of Information  
• Risk Dominance   
• Organizational Process Failures   
• Bureaucratic Interests and Politics  
 
To correct the public goods failure, the government could ensure delivery of 
private benefits.   Although  it  is  important  that  the  government  deliver  the  public  
goods  offered by ADS-B, private benefits can be used as a vehicle for encouraging 
airspace  user  equipage  and  attaining  implementation  of  the  public  goods.   
Through careful selection of benefits and incentives, the government can realign 
asymmetries of costs and benefits.  Asymmetry of information can be corrected by 
encouraging stakeholder involvement and working to effectively disseminate 
information.  Risk can be reduced by correcting information asymmetries and 
institutional failures. 
 
7.3    Policy Actions 
 
In  the  synthesis  portion  of  the  interviews,  airlines  suggested  several  policy  
actions  that would encourage them to equip.  These are categorized according to 
the modified Marais-Weigel framework. 
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Although the FAA has begun infrastructure development with ground 
infrastructure deployment and initial applications and procedures development, they 
can extend their use of this mechanism through flight trials.   Airlines  believe  that  
trials  are necessary to demonstrate the real benefits of ADS-B applications and to 
ensure  safety  and  certification  approval  for  the  applications  and  procedures.   
Several airlines have expressed eagerness to collaborate with the FAA on ADS-B 
trials.  To a limited extend, the FAA begun trials of ADS-B, focusing their work in 
Alaska and Louisville.  The Alaska trials were part of the Capstone program.  
However, the trials only demonstrated ADS-B via UAT, so the scope of the study 
only applies to GA aircraft.  In addition, airlines feel the data from the Capstone trials 
is not transparent and accessible.  Therefore, the results cannot be independently 
validated.  Trials with UPS in Louisville demonstrating CDA procedures have been 
more effective.  Airlines laud the achievements of these trials and they have been 
effective in providing proof of ADS-B benefits and garnering support for the program.  
Airlines would like to see this type of trial program expanded to more applications. 
To  increase  technology  value,  airline  interview  data  shows  the  best  action  
may  be to deliver benefits with high private value.  Applications with high private 
value  to  the  airlines  can  be  accelerated  through  the  development  and  
approval  process.  Examples of high benefit applications for the airlines are ADS-B 
in non-radar areas, arrival and departure procedures, and allowing reduced 
separation standards.  The  FAA  has  already  tried  to  increase  technology  value  
for  general  aviation  users  by  offering weather and information services through 
the FIS-B link.  However, with the emergence of satellite weather services, it is 
unclear if FIS-B services will provide as much of a benefit as previously calculated. 
There  many  ways  to  offer  positive  incentives,  including  direct  financing  
(cash),  tax credits, and preferential treatment.  Of these incentives, airlines 
preferred direct financing.  Some airlines liked preferential treatment, while others 
did not feel that it would be feasible.  Another potential positive incentive is 
guaranteeing benefits to the airlines by a certain date.  If the FAA is unable to deliver 
benefits by a certain date, they could offer to pay for lost benefits.  This would insure 
the airlines against institutional failures. 
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The FAA already has a mandate for ADS-B Out.   Airlines  like  the  mandate  
because  it  provides  insurance  for  their  investment  decisions  and  standardizes  
the  technology.  However, airlines suggested considering alternative instantiations 
of the mandate.  To encourage early equipage amongst a particular group of 
airspace users, the FAA could impose a mandate in select airspace, such as the 
airspace around New York, or around class B airports.  Some airlines suggested the 
FAA could accelerate the mandate for ADS-B Out for airlines.   A decrease in the 
program cycle length would decrease investment risk for the airlines.  Lastly, some 
airlines suggested a need for a mandate for ADS-B In. 
Putative measures include taxation and exclusionary airspace.   Taxation would 
tax anybody who is not equipped.  Exclusionary airspace is the inverse of 
preferential treatment.  It would not allow anybody not equipped to enter certain 
airspace.  Before  putative  measures  are  levied,  the  reason  for  stakeholder  
non-compliance  should  be  considered.  Some airspace users, particularly 
recreational GA, may be unwilling to equip because they cannot afford to do so.  In 
such a case, putative measures would unfairly inflict a double tax on these users.   
One  particularly  innovative  program  employed  by  AirServices  Australia  uses  
the  ATC  services  savings  from  ADS-B  to  fund GA equipage.  While the airlines 
do not reap financial benefits from the savings,  they  benefit  indirectly  from  having  
a  higher  percentage  of  equipped  planes  in  the  airspace. 
 
7.4    Policy Evaluation 
 
Figure   7-3  shows  a  summary  of  the  policy  options,  evaluated  against  the  
policy  selection criteria. 
As seen in Figure 7-3, no single measure sufficiently satisfies all the policy 
selection criteria. Instead, a combination of policies will likely be adopted to achieve 
the goals of the FAA and meet the criterion of the stakeholders.  The wide variety of 
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Figure 7-3:  Policy Mechanisms for Correcting Market Failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  94 
stakeholders does not  make  this  a  trivial  problem.   One way to package policies 
is by program phase.  Survey results show that different stakeholders are likely to 
equip at different phases of the program.  In essence, each stakeholder group reacts 
to a slightly different set of market conditions. 
According  to  the  surveys,  major  domestic  carriers  are  likely  to  be  the  
earliest  adopters.  Once the technology has become more mature, regionals, 
business jets, and other GA aircraft who can afford to equip are likely to equip.  
Recreational general aviation users are likely to be the last to equip due to a lack of 
benefits and inability to afford new the new technology. 
Amongst early adopters, the market failures were public goods failures and cost- 
benefit asymmetries due to short timeframes for airline ROI. The failures arise due  
to  externalities  from  pioneering  development  costs,  a  long  technology  
deployment  time,  and  higher  risk  of  program  failure.   Policies such as 
preferential treatment, offering high private benefits, and financing would likely 
encourage early adoption.  Preferential treatment and financing serve to internalize 
externalities produced by the early adopters.  High private benefits helps the airlines 
make a positive cost-benefit case for equipage. 
Two types of early adopters seem to exist for ADS-B. One type of early adopter 
is airlines that would equip if they could accumulate benefits from existing equipage 
and technologies.   This  type  of  early  adopter  plays  a  key  role  in  moving  
industry  momentum toward the new technology.  Therefore, they are strategically 
important for the FAA. For type one early adopter airlines, it is important to 
accelerate benefits. 
To accelerate benefits to early adopters, it may be beneficial to first find 
applications that offer private benefits using existing technology.  For example, the 
FAA could find applications that use ADS-B in conjunction with RNP or DO260 to 
provide benefits.  Existing technologies offer the advantage of having already gone 
through the certification process.  When thinking about benefits for early adopters, it 
is important that the benefits are independent, to allay fears about the impact of a 
mixed equipage environment. 
A  second  type  of  early  adopter  is  airlines  willing  to  invest  in  future  
concepts. 
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They are extremely useful to the FAA because they present an opportunity for the 
FAA to conduct trials of new avionics, such as DO260A, and to test new procedures.  
Because  development  work  in  future  concepts  requires  heavy  investment  and  
the  airlines produce significant positive externalities, it is important that the FAA help  
them internalize these externalities.  Potential actions for the FAA include financing 
equipage and offering preferential treatment. 
For  later  adopters,  market  failures  that  arise  are  information  asymmetries  
and  cost-benefit  asymmetries  stemming  from  a  lack  of  benefits.   These  market  
failures  stem from the fact that late adopters may have a relative paucity of 
resources and  the  program  does  not  offer  them  private  benefits.   If the goal is 
to encourage late adopters to equip earlier, it may be beneficial to provide 
information and accelerate applications that will provide high benefit to them. 
Conducting trials to prove benefits may help them establish a more compelling 
individual cost-benefit case.  These trials will likely follow naturally from early adopter 
equipage.  As a last resort, putative measures and mandates may be appropriate.   
However,  these  measures  should  be  instituted cautiously because they may act 
as a double tax for users who could not  afford  to  equip  in  the  first  place.   For a 
small subset of late adopters who cannot accord to equip (i.e. likely some 
recreational GA owners), direct financing might be appropriate. 
Meeting the benefits demands of all stakeholder groups will be challenging.  
However, overlaps in preferred benefits amongst stakeholder groups provide 
opportunities for government action.  For example, all types of airlines are interested 
in benefits that alleviate congestion in busy terminal areas.  Non-radar areas provide 
an opportunity to provide benefits to both GA and legacy carriers. 
In addition to targeted policies, some policies would be beneficial for the duration 
of the program.  These policies are targeted at market failures that affect many 
stakeholder groups.  Examples of these market failures are risk and institutional 
failures.  Risk can be reduced throughout the program by getting support from FAA 
leadership and eliminating organizational processes failures. 
All stakeholder groups were also concerned about a potential lack of benefits 
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from ADS-B.  This suggests a need for user-driven development of benefits.   The 
data presented in this thesis offer a starting point for thinking about applications 
designed to offer high user benefit.  As the program progresses, the users suggest 
that the FAA should provide them with data from technology trials and offer a 
transparent process for the users to offer input and suggestions. 
 
7.5    Implementation Difficulties 
 
Policy selection is only part of the work.  There may be tremendous difficulty in 
implementing some of the policies suggested in this chapter due to institutional 
failures.  In particular, institutional failures may inhibit the government's ability to act 
as a coordinating body through the reallocation of resources. 
One example is airline skepticism about the FAA's ability to offer early adopter 
incentives.  The airlines reason that if the incentives offered are truly valuable, 
lobbying groups will ensure the benefits are available to all users, regardless of 
equipage.  Lobbying is an example of a bureaucratic interest and politics institutional 
failure.  Lobbyists make it difficult for the FAA to shift benefits from one user group to 
another.  They also make it difficult for the FAA to offer incentives that apply only to 
a subset of stakeholders, such as incentives for early adopters.  A potential way 
around  this failure is making the stakeholders understand the reasoning for the 
action and  creating  an  atmosphere  of  perceived  fairness,  as  Airservices  
Australia  did  for  their  general aviation equipage plan. 
The FAA may also be limited in its ability to partner with airlines for trials of 
technology under development and future airspace concepts.  In particular, they may 
be accused of favoritism for partnering with specific airlines.  One airline suggested 
that a way around this problem is for the FAA to solicit information about potential 
early adopters through the Air Transport Association, the airline industry trade group. 
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7.6    Conclusion 
 
Government policies for correcting market failures are presented and evaluated.  
The Marais-Weigel framework is used to categorize government actions.  Potential 
policies were evaluated for their ability to correct market failures.   It is suggested 
that a combination of policies be adopted, depending upon the phase of the program 
and the airspace user's resources and needs.  Implementation difficulties associated 
with some suggested policies are discussed. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis presented an analysis of the problem of market driven technology 
transition in the air transportation system, focusing specifically on ADS-B. 
Technology  transition  problems  arise  because  of  the  network  characteristics  of  
ADS-B,  which  make it prone to market failure.  A market failure framework was 
used to identify potential sources of problems in ADS-B technology implementation.  
Market failures were illustrated using game theoretic analysis.  Data for the analyses 
was collected through a series of airline interviews.  Policy actions were evaluated 
for their ability to correct market failures. 
 
8.1    Summary of Results 
 
Fourteen airlines were interviewed to gather data on airline views of ADS-B costs 
and benefits, airline perception of ADS-B, and airline investment decisions.  For 
benefits, airlines are primarily interested in applications that provide efficiency 
improvements, fuel savings, and increase airspace capacity.   Benefits that provide 
high value to airspace users include reduced separation standards, arrival and 
departure procedures, and surveillance in current non-radar areas. Barriers identified 
by airlines fall into two categories - cost and uncertainty.  Costs are associated with 
cost of equipage.  GPS is expected to account for a large proportion of the cost for 
ADS-B Out.  Uncertainties  are  associated  with  institutional  failures  that  result   
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from  the  FAA  role  as  both  a regulatory and  market  agent.   Uncertainties serve 
to increase investment risk for airlines. 
It was found that different types of airspace users have different preferences and 
priorities.  This could make it difficult to deliver equal benefits to all stakeholders. 
Regional airlines participating in this study have a higher percentage of fleet GPS 
equipage than legacy airlines, indicating it may be easier for regionals to implement 
ADS-B. However, regionals are likely to act as late adopters while major carriers are 
likely to act as early adopters.  This is because regionals do not pay for their own 
fuel or set their own schedule, resulting in less emphasis on the types of benefits 
offered by ADS-B. 
Market failures identified to occur for the ADS-B technology implementation 
under market conditions include: 
Public Goods Failure due to low private benefits in the current set of 
proposed ADS-B applications.  
Asymmetry of Costs and Benefits due to differences in stakeholder 
preferences.  
Asymmetry of Information due to different levels of stakeholder knowledge 
and access to information regarding ADS-B.  
Risk Dominance resulting from difficulties in certification and perceived past 
problems with technology implementations.  
Organizational Process Failures which make it difficult to fit existing 
procedures to evolving situations, such as accommodating the level of 
changes needed  to approve ADS-B avionics and procedures.  
Bureaucratic  Interests  and  Politics which  can  inhibit  government  from  
making a sustained commitment to the project and taking necessary actions to  
correct market failures.  
 
Government intervention can be effective in correcting market failures.  
Government policies can work through many mechanisms, including infrastructure 
development and support, increasing technology value, offering positive incentives, 
issuing mandates, or levying putative measures.   It is suggested that governments 
should adopt a combination of policies and vary them according to the phase of the 
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project. 
In particular, it is important for the government to deliver private benefits, balance 
costs and benefits to stakeholders, give stakeholders more information, and correct 
institutional failures.  Private benefits incentivize users to equip and provide a vehicle 
for ensuring the delivery of public benefits.  For early adopters, the government 
should focus on internalizing externalities.  For late adopters, the government should 
focus on delivering information and insuring they have the resources to equip.  A 
mandate was considered a good idea by all airlines. 
 
8.2    Contributions 
 
This thesis presents two types of contributions.  First, a method for analyzing 
potential problems in air transportation technology initiatives is presented.  The 
method  applies  economic  ideas  of  market  failure  and  game  theoretic  analysis  
to  analyzing  stakeholder interactions in air transportation.  In this thesis, the method 
is used for the case of ADS-B technology adoption. 
The second contribution of this thesis is a body of knowledge regarding domes-  
tic  airline  views  on  ADS-B  technology  in  particular  and  equipage  investments  
in  general.  This knowledge will potentially be useful for government agencies 
thinking about technology transition in the future.  By using the method presented to 
analyze the ADS-B program implementation, this thesis bridges the gap between 
technology adoption theory and the practice of implementing infrastructure 
technologies in air transportation. 
 
8.3    Future Work 
 
Specific to ADS-B, a rigorous analysis of policy options presented in this thesis 
should be conducted to provide further guidance for government actions.  
Furthermore, as data regarding costs, benefits, and risk, becomes available, the 
game theoretic analysis of market failures can be refined.  It may be necessary to do 
further analyses for ADS- B In equipage or if conditions changes in the ADS-B 
project
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The methods and ideas used in this thesis can be used to analyze other 
coordination problems in air transportation that present network features.  In 
addition, it would be interesting to extend the application of the method to other 
problems with similar characteristics. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
Interview Instrument 
 
 
 
 
 
ADS-B Airline Industry Survey  
Professor John Hansman, Professor Annalisa Weigel, (Jenny) Xiaojie Hu  MIT 
International Center for Air Transportation (ICAT) 
 
Carrier Name:  
 
 Interviewee:       Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
The  MIT  International  Center  for  Air  Transportation,  in  the  Department  of  
Aeronautics  and  Astronautics,  is  working  with  the  FAA  to  investigate  
applications  and  benefits of ADS-B technology and user equipage.  This data will 
be valuable in informing  strategies  for  the  deployment  of  ADS-B  ground  
infrastructure  and  applications.  We  are  surveying  airlines  to  identify  their  views  
on  benefits  from  ADS-B  applications  and  costs  and  barriers  associated  with  
adoption  of  ADS-B.  Thanks  for  your  participation. 
 
 
For the purposes of this survey, ADS-B services are divided into two types - 1) 
Surveillance and 2) Broadcast services.  Broadcast services refer to TIS-B and FIS-
B. Surveillance services refer to all other ADS-B functionalities on both 1090 and 
UAT. 
 
 
 
Part I. Background:  
1.1 What is your role in your airline?  
 
1.2 In what capacity have you been involved in ADS-B?  
 
1.3 What is your airline's view of ADS-B?  
 
1.4 What is your airline's view of the NPRM for ADS-B Out? 
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Part II. Benefits Questions:  
We are considering ways to deploy the ADS-B infrastructure and would like 
feedback on applications and geographies for the rollout plan.  Infrastructure can be 
rolled out  in  three  types  of  service  volumes:  1)  Surface,  2)  Terminal,  and  3)  
Enroute.   The  surface  service  volume  refers  to  the  airport  traffic  area  and  
surface.   The terminal service volume is equivalent to a TRACON. The enroute 
service volume is equivalent to an ARTCC. 
 
ADS-B information can be linked to three locations:  the air traffic control center, the  
airline operations center, and airplane cockpits. 
 
2.1 Surveillance services:  For your airline, what benefits/applications can be derived  
from  linking  ADS-B  surveillance  data  to  the  following  locations.   Please  
consider  benefits associated with surface, terminal, enroute, and non-radar 
coverage airspaces. 
 
a) ATC  
 
b) Airline operations centers  
 
c) Airplane cockpits  
 
d) Other  
 
Are there specific locations where these benefits apply? 
 
Are  there  locations  where  it  would  be  beneficial  to  install  ADS-B  ground  
stations  early in the rollout process?  Which locations?  Why? 
 
2.2 Broadcast services:  Do you think there are any broadcast services that provide  
benefits your airline?  (i.e.  graphical weather information, NOTAMS, ect.)  
Yes                    No 
 
If yes, what benefits?  
Are there specific locations where the benefits apply? 
 
2.3 How do the equipage decisions of other airlines or users influence your decision 
to  equip with ADS-B?  
 
2.4 At the national level,  what do you see as the main obstacles for obtaining the  
ADS-B applications you mentioned?  
 
2.5 Are  the  benefits/applications  you  have  mentioned  enough  to  incentivize  
your  airline to equip with ADS-B? Why or why not?  
 
Part III. Costs and Barriers  
3.1 For your airline, what do you see as the main barriers or concerns regarding the 
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adoption of ADS-B? How do these costs and barriers compare in the way that they  
influence your decision to equip with ADS-B? 
 
3.2 What is your confidence that the benefits/applications you mentioned in Part II  
for ADS-B will receive operational approval by the FAA?  
 
3.3 What incentives, or mandates beyond operational benefits would be most 
effective  in encouraging your fleet to equip?  
 
 
Part IV. Current Status  
4.1 What is your airline's philosophy towards fleet operation?  (i.e.  Do you operate  
separate fleets for certain routes?)  
 
4.2 What level and type of ADS-B equipment is on your current fleet?  How much of  
your fleet is GPS equipped?  
 
4.3 Are your new aircraft delivered with ADS-B?   
Yes No 
 
What level of ADS-B equipage do they have?  (i.e.  DO 260 v.  DO260A) 
 
4.4 What type of equipment upgrades would be needed to make your fleet NPRM  
(for ADS-B Out) compliant?  (i.e.  DO260A, GPS with WAAS, TSO-C166a) 
 
 
Part V. Future Plans  
5.1 The NPRM suggests a mandate for ADS-B Out only.  Does your airline have 
plans  to equip with ADS-B In?  Why or why not?  
 
5.2 Is  your  airline  planning  any  other  modernization  efforts?   (i.e.   RNP,  
CPDLC,  etc.)  What is the relative priority of these technologies compared with 
ADS-B ?  
 
 
Part VI. Synthesis  
6.1 Have you been involved with other modernization efforts?   
Yes                    No 
 
What lessons learned from those experiences can be applied to ADS-B? 
